Behind and beyond al-Sisi’s bid

Source:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Date of source:
28 Feb 2014
Reference:
The resignation of Egypt’s government on 24 
February has reignited the debate about the presidential ambitions of Defence Minister Abdel Fattah 
al-Sisi. Leaving the ministerial post would have given 
him the opportunity to exit the armed forces and fi-
nally declare his candidacy (only civilians can stand 
for office in Egypt) – but, for the time being, he remains a minister. Moreover, on 27 February, he became the first ever military figure to be appointed 
the head the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces. 
A post usually reserved for the president, al-Sisi has 
now been named by President Mansour as the formal 
commander-in-chief. 
The move has raised anew the larger question of the 
military’s role in Egypt’s political landscape. If elected 
president, will al-Sisi’s rule result in a military dictatorship, or will it lead to the military withdrawing 
from politics? All will depend on the Egyptian armed 
forces, and whether or not they can protect their institutional, economic, and symbolic roles and interests.
A political animal?
Although the Egyptian armed forces have several 
‘identities’, they are first and foremost perceived to 
be political actors. This is primarily due to the decisive role that the military has played in Egypt’s 
recent history: in 1952, it toppled the monarchy, and 
every president since then – with the exception of 
Mohamed Morsi and current interim President Adly 
Mansour – has had a military background. But to 
simply conclude, therefore, that Egypt has been – or 
indeed will be – a stratocracy (a state run by the military), would be to misunderstand the complex manner in which Egyptian power dynamics have evolved 
over time. 
While the Egyptian armed forces have traditionally enjoyed a privileged relationship with those in 
charge, they have also constituted a potential threat 
to the country’s political leaders. Regardless of their 
background, whoever wanted to remain in power 
was required to simultaneously keep the military on 
board and in check. By failing to do so, Gamal Abdel 
Nasser faced serious challenges by Chief of Staff and 
Defence Minister Abdel Hakim Amer. And following 
Egypt’s defeat against Israel in 1967 and attempts to 
remove the armed forces from politics, Anwar Sadat 
was assassinated by a fundamentalist officer during 
a military parade in 1981. Hosni Mubarak, a former 
air marshal, recognised that the politicisation of the 
armed forces not only endangered the political elite, 
it also jeopardised military effectiveness. As a consequence, he continued the existing professionalisation 
programme designed to depoliticise the military.  
Tout d’abord, a military institution
Political involvement always has a negative effect 
on the military capabilities of armed forces: affecting their cohesion, discipline, appointment mechanisms, and meritocratic principles. A military coup generally benefits only a handful of individuals and 
harms the institution at large – hence the frequent 
occurrence of counter-coups. The Egyptian military’s 
principal interest is an institutional one: since its defeat in 1967, it has pursued the creation and maintenance of professional standards necessary to perform 
adequately in the military sense, and has sought to 
reduce political meddling through internal procedures. 
However, a highly professional force needs to be 
flanked by adequate civilian oversight: the more professional a force becomes, the more it strengthens features which are useful for staging a coup: cohesion, 
command structure, strong bonds between officers 
and the troops, and material support. It is precisely in order to reduce this political threat that many 
dictators – such as Saddam Hussein or Muammar 
Qaddafi – deliberately weakened their own military institutions. Both Sadat and Mubarak, however, 
granted the military the necessary leeway to professionalise, and the Egyptian armed forces, although 
monitored by military intelligence, were not subject 
to coup-proofing measures. 
Today, ins titutional inter es ts pr ecede all other concerns: Egypt’s generals seek the freedom to operate 
along military lines and will fight attempts by politicians to meddle in their affairs. This occupational 
mindset was also reflected in its tacit acceptance 
of President Morsi’s dismissal of then Minister of 
Defence Tantawi and Chief of Staff Anan. Contrary to 
public perception, the armed forces allowed this not 
because they accepted civilian control, but because it 
benefited the officer corps: the removal of two senior 
officers resulted in a promotion for several others. 
An economic actor, too
The Egyptian military’s economic role dates back 
to Sadat’s presidency, and it is now involved in an 
estimated 15% of the country’s economic activities. 
Faced with budget constraints following his liberal 
reform policies, Sadat allowed the armed forces 
to self-finance to a certain extent – a policy which 
Mubarak pursued further. Since then, the  military 
is engaged in multiple bodies, which are active in 
fields ranging from civilian manufacturing to farming and services. Official statements put its income at 
€550 million per year, but this figure is estimated to 
be much higher. These attempts to self-finance have 
been accompanied by an ever-decreasing military 
budget: in 2012, at 1.7% of GDP, it was one of the 
lowest in the region.
Those in the military enjoy many economic perks. 
For example, as compensation for low pensions, retired officers have preferential access to positions in state bureaucracies and privatised former state enterprises. The military budget of over €3 billion is also 
effectively administrated outside of civilian control, 
and American military aid (almost €1 billion a year) 
is handled directly by the armed forces. 
With such privileges threatened by the liberal reform 
agenda of Mubarak’s son Gamal, who was poised 
to become his successor, the surprise siding of the 
armed forces with the protesters in January 2011 
can also be seen as a move designed to protect their 
economic interests – interests which President Morsi 
was later careful to preserve.
And a national symbol 
The Egyptian military’s third core interest lies in its 
relationship with the Egyptian people, and the preservation of its image as the national symbol. Tracing 
its origins back to Khedive Muhammed Ali and the 
creation of modern Egypt in the 19th century, it embodies – and seeks to embody – Egyptian nationalism. Its wars against Israel, its history of political involvement, its use of conscription, and its emotional 
attachment to Gamal Abdel Nasser all play into the 
military’s narrative of being the cradle of modern 
Egypt. 
state bureaucracies and privatised former state enterprises. The military budget of over €3 billion is also 
effectively administrated outside of civilian control, 
and American military aid (almost €1 billion a year) 
is handled directly by the armed forces. 
With such privileges threatened by the liberal reform 
agenda of Mubarak’s son Gamal, who was poised 
to become his successor, the surprise siding of the 
armed forces with the protesters in January 2011 
can also be seen as a move designed to protect their 
economic interests – interests which President Morsi 
was later careful to preserve.
And a national symbol 
The Egyptian military’s third core interest lies in its 
relationship with the Egyptian people, and the preservation of its image as the national symbol. Tracing 
its origins back to Khedive Muhammed Ali and the 
creation of modern Egypt in the 19th century, it embodies – and seeks to embody – Egyptian nationalism. Its wars against Israel, its history of political involvement, its use of conscription, and its emotional 
attachment to Gamal Abdel Nasser all play into the 
military’s narrative of being the cradle of modern 
Egypt.