Egypt Conflict Alert

Source:
INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP
Date of source:
4 Feb 2013
Reference:
It is difficult to know which is most dangerous: the serious
uptick in street violence; President Morsi’s and the Muslim
Brotherhood’s serial inability to reach out to the rest of the
political class inclusively; or the opposition clinging to the hope
of some extraneous event (demonstrations, foreign pressure,
judicial rulings or military intervention) allowing it to gain
power while bypassing arduous compromise and politics. They
are tied of course: the president’s cavalier treatment of the
constitution-writing process and the judiciary and the
opposition’s lethargic approach to politics and rejection of
Islamist legitimacy alike have eroded the authority of state
institutions. This encourages in turn unrest and contributes to
the economic slide. Together, these heighten risks of a
complete breakdown of law and order. For two years, political
factions repeatedly have failed to reach consensus on basic
rules of the game, producing a transition persistently
threatening to veer off the road. It is past time for the
president and opposition to reach an accommodation to restore
and preserve the state’s integrity.
Since President Mubarak’s ouster, the level of violence has
ebbed and flowed, yet each new wave brings the country closer
to tipping point. Already, some police officers, beleaguered by
attacks on their headquarters, are considering removing their
uniforms and going home; there is talk of brewing discontent
among Central Security Forces, the riot control police; and
criminal gangs along with looters profit from the chaos. There
are new shocking images of police brutality. Many young
Egyptians increasingly appear disillusioned with electoral
politics, and some are drawn to anarchical violence.
The situation is made worse by deteriorating economic
conditions. As foreign currency reserves decline, the
government finds it ever more difficult to prop up the Egypt’s
pound or maintain fuel and food subsidies. One should not be
surprised to see larger segments of the population joining in
socio-economic riots. By current trends, Egypt could find itself
in a vicious cycle of economic under-performance and political
instability, the one fuelling the other.
At first glance, the immediate trigger of the current crisis might
appear to be entirely local. The violence that claimed the lives
of dozens in Port Said began as reaction to death sentences for
21 soccer fans charged with killing a rival team’s fans. Yet, the
events are symptomatic of a larger trend erosion of respect for
governing institutions. In the Suez Canal Zone and the Nile
Delta, protestors have violently targeted administrative buildings, symbols of an authority viewed as removed,
arbitrary and impotent. The collapse of the police and
increased porosity of borders with Libya and Sudan, thus a
marked increase in the illegal trafficking of light arms, further
enable street violence.
Overshadowing this is a broader political context: a persistent,
perilous standoff between on one side the president and his
Islamist backers for whom elections appear to mean
everything, and, on the other, opposition forces for whom they
seem to mean nothing; between those in power who deny
adversaries respect and those not in power who deny Islamists
legitimacy. The constitution-writing process was a sad
microcosm: Islamist contempt in forcing through what ought to
have been a carefully constructed, consensual document;
opposition recklessness in seeking to exploit the moment to
topple the Brotherhood; one celebrating a narrow conception of
majority rule, the other holding to a counter-productive notion
of street politics.
In the absence of a shared view of the foundations of a future
political system, Islamists are pressing their vision, while their
opponents play spoilers. This has the makings of a self-fulfilling
prophecy: the more the opposition obstructs and calls for
Morsi’s ouster, the more it validates the Islamists’ conviction it
will never recognise their right to govern; the more the
Brotherhood charges ahead, the more it confirms the others’
belief of its monopolistic designs over power. Even if leaders
back away from the brink, this could quickly get out of hand,
as their ability to control the rank and file – and, in the case of
the opposition, ability to represent the rank and file – dwindles.
Reversing these dynamics requires efforts on two fronts.
Politically, the key is mutual acceptance of two realities: that
the Brotherhood’s electoral victories give their rule legitimacy,
but that a historic, complex transition in a challenging security
and economic context requires exercise of power to be
tempered by meaningful consensus-building.
Several steps would help: an end to opposition calls for the
president to step down and agreement by Morsi that the
constitution, whose adoption was marred by boycotts and low
voter turnout, ought to be revised to allay the apprehensions
of non-Islamists and notably the Coptic community. Likewise,
the process for designing the elections law – another topic of
sharp disagreement, especially on district boundaries and the
representation of women – should be revisited to reflect
broader agreement among factions. Finally, in the wake of
approaching parliamentary elections, parties should seek to
form a national coalition, a result that would serve both the
Muslim Brotherhood (which would gain from the opposition
becoming a responsible stakeholder) and the opposition (which
would be better positioned to impede what it views as efforts
to institute single party rule).
The National Dialogue the president proposes is a possible
forum. It should build upon the 31 January Azhar
memorandum in which all sides disavowed violence and
promised serious discussion; its agenda – to find a way to
amend the constitution and set the legal framework for
legislative elections – needs to be clearly defined in advance;
participation should be expanded to include representatives of
youth activists and protesters. Parties should commit that, for
decisions requiring legislative action, their future elected legislators would vote consistent with understandings reached
in the dialogue.
The second set of challenges relates to the security
environment. Security sector reform broadly construed –
including mechanisms to ensure accountability and justice for
victims of police brutality; training in crowd control; but also
measures to restore law and order – needs to be tackled, and
soon.
The alternative could well be a downward spiral toward greater
insecurity, violence, social unrest and economic collapse. It
also could be failure of a transition to which all eyes are turned
and whose fate would reverberate far beyond its boundaries.