Background:

Iraqi scholar Dr. Thābit ʿAbdāllah discusses the economic and political consequences of Iraq under Ṣaddām Ḥussaīn’s regime, who ruled from 1979 up to 2003. ʿAbdāllah elaborates upon the 1991 March Uprisings in Iraq, the Ḥussaīn family relations and the effects of the Kuwaiti invasion.

Side A:

After the disaster of the Kuwaiti invasion, there were allegedly two main consequences for the Iraqi people: an economic collapse and the failure of the March uprisings. The economic collapse affected the middle class the most, according to ʿAbdāllah, who argues that unlike in Egypt, where the middle class hardly even exists, Iraq had a very strong middle class. In Egypt, there are the very rich people and the extremely impoverished, and in Iraq this was not the case. After the downfall of the Iraqi dinar, the gap between rich and poor became much larger in Iraq. A lot of Iraqis had left for economic reasons, others due to the failure of the uprisings. ʿAbdāllah argues that it was not an uprising of minorities as the entire Kurdish population and the entire south, which make up 80% of the Iraqi population already rose up against the regime. There were also major mutinies near Baghdad and around it. Many people fled to Jordan.

Moreover, Ṣaddām Ḥussaīn is still remembered today as one of the most ruthless leaders of the previous century, but ʿAbdāllah argues a lot more people have perhaps even more blood on their hands than the former Iraqi president. Ḥussaīn Kāmel al-Majīd, Ṣaddām’s second cousin and son-in-law was an extremely unpopular figure, and according to ʿAbdāllah, people were not looking forward to Ḥussaīn Kāmel succeeding Ṣaddām in presidency. Ḥussaīn Kāmel is responsible for a number of horrendous acts including the militant industry that is in charge of the nuclear/poison gas programme. Rumour had it that in the south, the water was poisoned because of these programmes. Another key figure, Ṣaddām Kāmel, who was another second cousin and son-in-law of Ṣaddām Ḥussaīn, also had a lot of blood on his hands. Ṣaddām Kāmel was in charge of the most notorious prisons. Many of the people who were part of the uprisings were either killed or put in these prisons and severely tortured.

Additionally, the Ḥussaīn family suffered many feuds. The main one being between Ḥussaīn Kāmel with Ṣaddām Kāmel on his side versus ʿUday Ṣaddām Ḥussaīn with Quṣay Ṣaddām on his side. Ṣaddām Ḥussaīn saw a conflict developing between his sons and his nephew Ḥussaīn Kāmel, so he decided he wanted to separate them as to evade the conflict that may cause instability in Baghdad. ʿAbdāllah argues that the regime had significantly weakened after the mass uprising and the Kuwaiti invasion. The situation in Iraq had not been as tightly controlled as prior to the Kuwaiti war. The feud between the nephews and the brothers of Ṣaddām had not been the only one in the family. Quṣay, Ṣaddām’s younger son, was very close to his paternal uncles (Ḥussaīn Kāmel, Ṣaddām Kāmel and his father’s half-brothers), while ʿUday was closer to his maternal uncles. Many people were talking about a dispute between the paternal and the maternal side of the family: a dispute between Quṣay and ʿUday. Many Tikrītīs feared that if the regime collapses through the uprising, those related to Ṣaddām or anyone who originates from Tikrīt would be despised and it would lead to a massacre.

Dr. ʿAbdāllah believes that any real democratic change in Iraq can only occur if all of the many different ethno-religious groups in Iraq are recognised and given greater roles. Since the start of the Ṣaddām Ḥussaīn regime, Iraq had not only been ruled by Sunnis but also by Tikrītīs. The central part of al-Baṣrah where the uprisings began is Sunni, but the al-Baṣrah Sunnis and the Baghdadi Sunnis have been left out alongside with the minority groups who do not originate from Tikrīt. Ṣaddām made it a Sunni-Shia conflict, when according to ʿAbdāllah this was not initially the case. It was originally a dispute between Ṣaddām’s partisans and the opposition. ʿAbdāllah argues that any democratic change has to raise the political say of groups, such as the Kurds and the southern Shias.