This paper begins by reviewing Egypt’s post-2011 transition prior to 2013, which includes briefs on the 2011-2012 parliamentary elections, the 2012 presidential elections, and unrest and sectarian violence during the period between Ḥusnī Mubārak’s overthrow and the summer of 2013. The paper then transitions to the period following July 2013 and begins by evaluating changes to the 2012 constitution and the laws governing the election of Egypt’s new unicameral legislature in 2015. While better guarantees were offered in 2015 regarding women and religious minorities’ equal representation in the legislature, references to freedom of assembly and expression in the 2014 Constitution were confined by new restrictions on political life and civil society, with fundamental rights having been reduced through the 2013 protest law, the 2015 anti-terrorism law, amendments to the Penal code, and under an ongoing state of emergency used to justify the arrest of hundreds of non-violent regime critics, journalists, and human rights defenders over often charges like alleged links to terrorist organizations, misuse of social media, and spreading “false” news.
Moreover, the new election law weakened political parties in favor of independents, while major parties turned a blind eye to rights violations or were fractured by internal disputes amid the crackdown on political dissidents, activists, human rights lawyers, and journalists that followed Muḥammad Mursī’s ouster. These factors have allowed for the dominance of pro-government forces in parliament and laid the groundwork for the emergence of new political parties that have expressed explicit support for the state and the armed forces. Parliament swiftly approved the 2015 anti-terrorism law, which had been enacted by the cabinet in the absence of a legislature, as well as amendments to the law expanding the state’s definition of terrorist entities in 2020.
Egypt’s Parliament also approved in April 2019 amendments to the constitution — later passed in a national referendum that same month — which sought to extend the current president’s term in office, among other changes, while some members of opposition parties part of the Democratic Alliance and later the Civil Democratic Movement have faced arrest and even violence.
The final section of this paper discusses the state of press freedom and censorship in Egypt, documents the arrest and detention of activists, lawyers, politicians, and journalists, and details the way in which remand detention and “rotation” has been used to silence non-violent regime critics.
Madeleine Hall is obviously critical of the developments after 2011, with Egypt going from a period of unrest and violence to a country defined by increasing restrictions on press freedom and political life for the sake of stability. Many political activists and regime critics are indeed not engaged in political violence, but in a country with over 30% of the population living below the poverty line and another 50% not living far from this line, the risk of political activism transitioning to violence or unrest is always present. The government is strongly focused on economic development, a task made more difficult amid the unfolding coronavirus crisis. This focus on bolstering the economy is ultimately expected to benefit the poorer sections of the population. Although development requires stability, ongoing restrictions have come with a heavy price, as we see in Hall’s paper.
