EGYPT is struggling with an internal and violent political and social conflict which will continue to undermine domestic stability.

Its security, economy and social cohesion have been battered by a continuing tripartite struggle between the Muslim Brotherhood and its forces and supporters, the liberals and the youth who together led the popular street uprisings over the last two years. Those uprisings led to the downfall of two presidents, Hosni Mubarak (1981 to 2011) and Mohamed Morsi (June 2012 to July 2013).

The army has shifted positions in this struggle to maintain order and to protect its own significant economic interests amounting to 20 per cent of the Egyptian economy.

Recent violence, such as the explosion at the Military Intelligence Headquarters in Ismailia on October 19, 2013, is blamed on the Muslim Brotherhood.

The latest flashpoint between the four groups is the proposed ‘law on demonstrations’ which strictly regulates street protests. It is being fiercely opposed by both the liberals and the Brotherhood.

The army and the broad coalition government have so far hesitated to impose the law.

The uncertainty is likely to continue and Egypt could remain in this quasi-vacuum over the next few years as regional dynamics gain the upper hand over the global engagement typical over the last three decades.

The reason for this shift from global to regional dynamics is significant. It is based on a visible rift in Saudi-US relations leading the Saudis to focus on their backyard rather than relying on the US for protection.

The collapse in trust started when the Saudis supported President Hosni Mubarak in the Egyptian revolution of February 2011.

The Saudis were shocked when the US ‘sacrificed’ its erstwhile ally, Hosni Mubarak, and they were also vehemently opposed to his successor Mohamed Morsi, who was supported by Qatar, Saudi Arabia’s less than well- loved Gulf neighbour.

The Saudis fully supported the Egyptian army as it re-took power from the Muslim Brotherhood in August 2013. The Muslim Brotherhood is a hated political movement in Saudi Arabia.

The Saudis, together with Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) pledged US$17 billion in cash and oil and gas, as concerns mounted over America’s annual US$2 billion aid package to Egypt. They also replaced the Qatari deposit at the Egyptian Central Bank to support the Egyptian pound.

These moves, offering help and support, were diametrically opposed to the political noises emanating from its ally America and particularly President Barack Obama’s administration.

Tensions have been rising between the two allies since Saudi Arabia, together with fellow Gulf Cooperation Council members, intervened militarily in Bahrain in March 2011. The intervention, under the Peninsula Shield arrangement, was to restore order by putting down a Shiite uprising which the Saudis argued was instigated by Iran in order to destabilise Bahrain. Saudi Arabia seemed to have concluded that the US, post Mubarak, was losing its interest and grip on Middle Eastern affairs.

Bahrain, a small kingdom island separated from the Saudi eastern coast by only a few miles of sea, is the base for the US 5th Fleet headquarters. America’s indifference was seen as just the tip of the iceberg of US disengagement.

There is widespread belief that the US is shifting its focus away from the Gulf and the Middle East to the Asia-Pacific region.

There is also a feeling that America’s growing energy independence, powered by its shale gas revolution, means that the Gulf States will have to take their security and defence into their own hands rather than rely on protection from the US.

The understanding so far has been that America provided defence and security in return for its allies ensuring stable and reasonably-priced supplies of oil and gas to international markets.

The Saudis became convinced that the international game, played through the US and the United Nations Security Council, is over when America called off its planned military strike on Syria and followed this with a new US-Iran rapprochement.

Saudi Arabia reacted by rejecting its seat on the UN Security Council on October 17, 2013, and its foreign minister, Prince Saud al-Faisal, failed to take up his allocated speaking slot at the UN General Assembly.

It is clear that Saudi Arabia sees regional politics as the only game to secure its interests, particularly as it now fears an Iran-US agreement. Iran is Saudi Arabia’s main regional rival.

Egypt will look increasingly towards its regional allies and will have to start playing by the rules of regional politics including Saudi Arabia’s views, particularly regarding its arch foe, Iran.