Background:
Maḥjūb al-Tijānī is the president of the Sudan Human Rights Organisation in the branch of Cairo and Ḥamūd Fātḥā al-Raḥman, the secretary general of the same organization, discuss the atrocities of the al-Turābī/al-Bashīr regime, and the means by which the Sudanese people are dealing with this way of living. They discuss the signs of brewing rebellious attitudes among the Sudanese people and the future of Sudan, if the regime were to eventually fall.
The other part of the tape concerns two separate subjects, the accusation of apostasy of Naṣr Ḥāmid Abū Zayd, and the series of arrests of Muslim Brotherhood members a month before the 1995 parliamentary elections in Egypt.
Throughout the recording, the interviewees speak English with several short Arabic transitions.
Side A:
Al-Tijānī argues that since the 1989 coup, the current regime is hated and the people of Sudan do not respect it. Numerous human rights violations have been reported: alter alia, arbitrary arrests, intervention in foreign countries’ affairs and extrajudicial killings, which have led to economic depression and lack of freedom of religion and expression. The Sudanese regime is isolated regionally and internationally. Al-Tijānī says it has led to a great disturbance for the Sudanese people, causing them to be fed up and he expects the Sudanese to stand up soon and fight the regime. The terrorist regime, as al-Tijānī calls it, is not going to last long due to the international and national pressures on Sudan. The continuation of the war, the large masses of displaced Sudanese, the tensions between Egypt and Sudan, and the fact that the regime has been condemned by African countries due to its alleged involvement in Mubārak’s assassination attempt are all signs of the regime cracking says al-Tijānī. He believes the momentum in Sudan has already begun and there are signs of people trying to get rid of the regime.
Al-Tijānī further more condemns the al-Turābī/al-Bashīr regime by stating that it is the worst Sudan has ever seen. Student movements in Sudan have been known to revolt because they are more prone to expressing their ideas and fight the police. However, he argues that it is no longer solely students revolting, but rather it has led to tensions among all levels of the Sudanese society, including lawyers, doctors, and businessmen.
Ḥassan al-Turābī, as religious and political Islamist leader of Sudan was known to have close relations with the Muslim Brotherhood. Al-Tijānī mentions ʿAbd al-Khāliq Maḥjūb, who was the secretary general of the Sudanese Communist Party in the 1960s, and says Maḥjūb wrote about the Muslim Brotherhood and al-Turābī as terrorists. Al-Tijānī shares the same viewpoints regarding the Muslim Brotherhood, and al-Turābī and argues that the communists are still antagonised by al-Bashīr and labelled as the only obstacle in the way of the regime. Nevertheless, al-Tijānī believes it is no longer just the communists who are opposed to the regime, but also the SPLA, SPLM and as aforementioned many other levels of the Sudanese society.
Ḥamūd Fātḥā al-Raḥman believes the regime will not continue to last without its aspects of oppression, suppression, and aggression of the popular movements. The Sudanese people have accordingly, a long history of uprisings and what is happening right now (the time of when the interview was conducted) cannot yet be called an uprising. This fundamentalist regime, as al-Raḥman calls it, changed the entire model of Sudan’s army, security, and civil service and has a tight grip over the people in attempt to suppress such potential uprisings. If the regime cannot be stopped from supressing, eventually an uprising will occur and the regime will fall, but this time has not yet come argues al-Raḥman.
Both al-Tijānī and al-Raḥman believe the regime will eventually fall, but many people have lost faith in democracy. Al-Raḥman believes the best alternative for the current regime is the National Democratic Alliance, which is composed of political armies, trade union, and even factions of the national army. Al-Tijānī, however, is afraid that if the Sudanese do indeed succeed in revolting, the regime will cause genocide as they are ruthless and ready to kill off an entire people, only so that they may continue to oppress and terrorise the Sudanese society.
Side B:
Islamist Shaykh Yūsuf al-Badrī had accused Naṣr Ḥāmid Abū Zayd of apostasy and mentions that the original papers of Naṣr Ḥāmid Abū Zayd’s case had not arrived yet, and so the court hearing is delayed. He explains that Abū Zayd had been a target of 7 different cases filed against him, but that for many of the cases there was a lack of evidence. Abū Zayd, at the time of the interview, is living in the Netherlands temporarily, but the court hearing will be on the 20th of September (a week after the interview was conducted). Shaykh al-Badrī believes that the law will be on his side, and says that due to the urgent nature of the case, the final decision will be taken in a matter of weeks instead of the usual time period of years.
Furthermore, Maurice Ṣādiq, a Christian human rights lawyer defends Abū Zayd and argues that the court must rule in Abū Zayd’s favour because the man is a Muslim man and believes in God: how can he be labelled an apostate? This case is essentially very dangerous, according to Ṣādiq, because of this sinful status of apostasy: Abū Zayd is at risk of being killed.
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Political activist and Islamist, Majdī Ḥussaīn, speaks about November 1995 crackdown against the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) right before the Parliamentary elections. Ḥussaīn argues that the Egyptian government wanted to crush the main enemy – the Muslim Brotherhood – in the elections before these were over. He thinks that the use of the military court against the Muslim brotherhood is an illogical act and has more to do with politics that actual crime. Most MB members who had been arrested would have been potential candidates in the elections, and Ḥussaīn is highly sceptical of the series of arrests of the members. He advocates that it is unjust to accuse MB members of illegal activities because they have allegedly not done anything illegal or violent for that matter. It is clear to Ḥussaīn that the ruling party, in cooperation with the government used their own political agenda to antagonise the MB. Furthermore, it is illegal for the government to make use of the military court concerning citizens because this court is intended primarily for members of the army. The government allegedly exploits the state of emergency, under which the nation has been ruled for many years. Ḥussaīn argues that it is impossible for an emergency to last 14 years, and so it is clear that Mubārak exploits the situation in order to hold a tighter grip over the people.
