When former president Morsi (Mursī) was ousted on July 3, the Political Road Map announced by General Abdul Fatāh Al Sīsī called to amend the 2012 Constitution, which was widely seen as the Constitution of the Muslim Brotherhood rather than Egypt’s Constitution.

Coptic groups have different aspirations for the Constitution based on their different visions for the new Egypt. Though they were active in the 2013 uprising, Copts have been targeted by Morsi supporters, as well as thugs, in order to stifle these ambitions. Recently, though, their participation in the Constituent Assembly (the 50-man committee for amending the Constitution) has given a voice to the many diverse perspectives of Copts concerning their relationship to the state.

Photo Credit: al-Youm al-Sābi'

There are three main camps of Coptic political groups vis-à-vis the Constitution: a Coptic political mainstream,

willing to accommodate opposing opinions concerning constitutional articles; a Coptic left, calling for quick and fundamental change for the relationship of the Copts and the state; and a political right, calling for further restrictions on religious liberties to ensure the control of the Church over its own affairs.                                                                                                                              

The Mainstream View

The Coptic mainstream perspective to the constitutional amendments can be viewed by the Coptic Orthodox Church in its memorandum on the constitutional amendments released in late July 2013. This viewpoint sees a moderate amendment to the articles, which takes into consideration the cultural and political realities in contemporary Egypt. The Church is decisive in abolishing Article 219, which installs a strict code of Islam.  Still, as a moderate conservative entity, they assert that Article 2, which states that Islam is the religion of the state and Arabic its official language and that principles of Islamic Sharia are the principal source of legislation, should remain in the Constitution.

The Coptic Orthodox Church has also requested amendments, carefully contouring the role of Islam in the public affairs. This includes Article 4, which it requested to be reworded to read that the Azhar scholars are consulted in Islamic affairs, rather than Islamic law, in order to limit the jurisdiction of the Azhar scholars on public affairs. Article 43, which pertains to freedom of belief, should be amended to reflect that the article is absolute, in order not to have their own faith compromised. In addition they requested a specification in Article 33 stating, “equality before the law without discrimination” to specify that the “state takes upon itself to combat all forms of discrimination in addition to the traditional customs that lead to it”, due to the traditional norms that discriminate between the different creeds in society, and leads to a number of sectarian misunderstandings and thus clashes. Pertaining to Article 11, which reads “The State shall safeguard the cultural and linguistic constituents of society, and foster the Arabization of education, science and knowledge,” it requested to add “which leads to the scientific progress and supports social cohesion and national attachment”. This is to ensure that the “cultural constituents” of society will not be an impediment to its national unity.

The Coptic Orthodox Church, however, due to its moderate conservative position, was hesitant on taking a stance on Article 3, unlike the Catholic and Evangelical churches.[1] Bishop Bola insisted that he requested Article 3 to remain. It reads: “The canon principles of Egyptian Christians and Jews are the main source of legislation for their personal status laws, religious affairs, and the selection of their spiritual leaders”.  The Catholic and Evangelical Churches, on the contrary, took a different position on Article 3, requesting the re-wording of the phrase “Christians and Jews” to be replaced with “non-Muslims”.

Dr. Safwāt Al Bayādī, the head of the Coptic Evangelical Community Council, assured that there is nothing to fear from amending Article 3. In addition, Bishop Antonius Azīz, representative of the Coptic Catholic Church, assured that the amending the article to include “non-Muslims” will remove all forms of discrimination against Egyptians of different religious affiliations. He assured that it is not a grant but a right that has been highlighted by all religions.[2]

In spite of their differences, all Coptic churches have decided to present clergymen as representatives of “Copts” in the Constitution.  A number of Coptic movements, such as Copts without Restrictions[3] stated that the representation of the Church in the Constituent Assembly should not be considered as intervention of religion in politics, but rather that the Church has the right to be represented in the Constituent Assembly. Such movements have supported the role of Coptic religious leaders in politics, and thus support the old fashioned domination of religious leaders in politics, as in the Constitution. This stands at odds with left-leaning Copts.[4]

The Leftist Copts

The leftist Coptic groups, akin to the political left, staunchly reject any reference to Article 2 in the Constitution, insisting that it would institutionalize a discriminatory state. The Coptic left, which is made up of youth organizations, are movements that are restructuring the political scene with demands of equity, freedom, and nondiscrimination.  The Maspero Youth Union, which was formed in the aftermath of the 2011 Revolution and after the sit-ins in front of the Maspero building, includes both Muslims and Christians. They call for a strict inclusion that Egypt is a civic state and removing article two which states that the "Islam is the main source of legislation." The group also proposes that an article is included that states that Egypt is a "civil state."

The Coptic left refuses the institutionalization of religion in the Constitution. Stressing complete equality and nondiscrimination, they insist on a civic state that respects all of its citizens, regardless of their religion. These Coptic movements have criticized the absence of Coptic civil representation in the assembly and that seats are limited to the leaders of the three Churches, meaning that the representation goes only to the Churches as religious institutions and not to the Copts as civilians.

By the same token, the proposed amendments by some international Coptic organizations, such as the U.S.-based, Coptic Solidarity, fall under this category of the left.  Coptic Solidarity’s list of constitutional amendments includes allowing citizens with dual nationalities to run in the parliamentary elections. They see it pertinent to amend Article 2, and stated in no uncertain words that it is an “idol that everyone fears of changing”.

The Coptic Right

The Coptic right constitutes voices from within the Coptic churches requesting a tightening of religious liberties. Bishop Jeremiah, head of the Coptic Orthodox Cultural Center in Cairo, has stated on the 23rd of September that he refuses to amend Article 3 of the Constitution. He argued that amending it to be from “Christians and Jews” to “non- Muslims” will hurt both Muslims and Christians. He stated that if such a change was made, Christians would not be protected from the requests of Jehovah's Witnesses and other denominations that are not recognized by the churches. The only way to ensure the interests of the nation is to tighten the religious liberties in the face of less acceptable religious groups by the Church.  This position, unsurprisingly, stands in congruence with the positions of both the Azhar, which stated that amending it may threaten the pillars of society and disrupt public order, as well as give rights to the Shiites[5] and Baha’is[6] in Egypt. The Member of the Nour Party High Board, Sha’ban Abul Alīm, made a similar statement expressing his fear that the amendment of the third article to read “non-Muslims” might allow the “marriage of homosexuals”.[7] 

Coptic leftist activists have organized a number of protests against the statements of Bishop Jeremiah, assured that it results in Copts becoming dhimmīs, rather than full citizens. The same group has organized protests against the choice of a member of the clergy, Bishop Bola, as the representative of Orthodox Copts in the Constituent assembly.[8]

The Coptic Quota

The idea of the Coptic quota was presented by The Egyptian Union for Human Rights headed by Najīb Jibraīl, who requested an amendment to Article 38 in the 2012 Constitution, which states that all citizens are equal before the law, to state that Copts and women are to constitute 30% of the Parliament, ministerial positions, and governors. The justification for this idea is that it will enable society to accept the idea of a Copt in power as it is now largely unthinkable. However, the institutionalization of positive discrimination for the Copts is viewed by many Copts as problematic.

In January, when this idea was first presented, scores of Coptic activists denounced the proposal. The representatives of the Coptic Churches similarly refused the concept of quota due to its sectarian basis.  The Maspero Youth Union on the other hand, stands firmly in support of the idea of a temporary Coptic quota, as a form of positive discrimination, to increase the number of Copts in the Parliament. They are demanding a swift change in the representation of Copts with little or no regard for the harmful precedent this could set within the system.

What the Future Holds

As explained above, Copts are not a monolithic unit; there is nothing such as an abstract political “Copt”. The demands of the Copts are diverse, differing according to their political outlooks. Copts, in that respect, reflect the different colors of the political spectrum in Egyptian society. More conservative elements of the Copts have very similar views to the conservative Islamists. Similarly, the leftist Copts share ideas with their left-leaning counterparts. Copts, with respect to their demands in the Constitution and their political views at large, cannot be taken as a single political block.

With such disparate voices, it is not likely that the controversy among the Copts on the relationship between church and state as well as their relationship to the state will end soon. The revolutionary dynamics have accelerated the motion of groups of Coptic left- leaning youth to go out to the streets and protest, not only against state policies, but also against the policies of the Church. It is likely that this will increase in the near future as these pertinent issues are raised in public discussions on the forthcoming constitution.

[1] In particular articles 3, 4, and 11 are among the articles of contention of the Churches with al-Azhar.

[2] Mīra Tawfīq, "Mumathil Al Kanīsah Al Kātholīkīyah bil khamsīn: Ta’dīl Al Madah Al Thālithah Laysa Hibah Min Ahad wa Inamā Haq kafilathu Al Adyān," Al Balad,  13 September 2013.  Read original text in Arabic.

[3] Māykal Fāris, "Aqbāt Bilā Quyūd: Al Kanīsah Lahā Haq Ikhtīyaār Mumathilīha Blagnit Ta’dil Al Dustūr," Al Yūm Al Sābi’, 11 August 2013. Read original text in Arabic.

[4] 'Abd al-Wahāb Sha'bān, “Al Aqbāt Yu’aliqūn Amāl Madanīyat Al Dawlah ‘ala lagnit al khamsīn,” al-Wafd, 4 September 2013, p. 5. Read original text in Arabic.

[5] Sabrī Abdil Hafīz, "Al Islamiyūn: Mādah Bil Dustūr Tubīh Zawāg Al Mithliyīn Wa ‘Abadat Al Shaytān," Elaph,  25 September 2013. Read original text in  Arabic.

[6] Cornelis Hulsman, Editor-in-chief Arab-West Report, knows from Egyptian media and previous meetings with Azhar officials that the Azhar does not recognize Baha'is

[7] Author not mentioned, "Al Nur: Ta’dil Al Mada Al thalithah Syasmah bzawag Al Mithliyeen Wal Shawaz," 18 September 2013, Aswāt Masrīyah. Read original text in Arabic.

[8] Māykal Fāris, “Shabāb Maspero Yarfud ‘Udwīyīt Al Anbā Bola Blagnit Ta’dīl A Dustūr”, al-Yawm al-Sābi', 11 August 2013. Read original text in Arabic.

Sarkha: A new Christian protest movement

Since the Revolution of July 23, 1952, Christians have been marginalized. This became visible when no Copt was elected for Parliament and only two MPs and one governor were nominated by Nasser.  This is very marginal in comparison to the period before the 1952 Revolution. It is also incomparable to the later years of the Presidents Sadat and Mubarak when the state made Christians more visible. But it was propaganda that served to complete the decoration of the state by including all its citizens.

Coverage of the Christian image in Egypt has been largely focused on agony and tragedies, with some hardships added by a wave of extremism in the 1980s and 1990s that targeted mainly Christians.

President Mubarak, unlike Nasser or Sadat, who were formed in cells of the Muslim Brotherhood,[1] was not influenced by Islamists. However, particularly in the last decade of his reign, Mubarak left internal affairs to be run by amateur politicians, headed by his son Gamal Mubarak and helped along by Safwat el-Sherif.  El-Sherif decided it was easiest for the state for Christians to be represented by the Pope of the Coptic Orthodox Church, who relished the position and sought more supremacy over Christians.

The burden on Christians has worsened dramatically since the 1970s with the burning of churches, sectarian incidents and violence, and neglecting the real representation of Christians in the Peoples’ Assembly and the Shura Council. Christian members appointed by the president were first recommended by the Church for reasons of relevance to the church, nothing more.

During the January 25 uprising in 2011 Christians took part in the revolt against the antiquated system. Christians, like all Egyptians had great dreams. The order was shifted, but this resulted in the Muslim Brotherhood coming to power in Egypt and the development of a weak state that is unable or perhaps even unwilling to take care of its own people.  The Muslim Brotherhood made promises for more justice based on verses mentioned in the Holy Qur’an. Initially, this brought the Copts hope, but excluding the Christians from social life and even from the demonstrations at Tahrir Square was a sign that the change would not come so easily.

The Maspero massacre (October 9, 2011) and massacres in many different villages showed the same faces of those in power of the state who wanted no change and with this defeated Christian interests.

The Constituent Assembly founded after June 30 witnessed added suffering on the list of the Christians’ tragedies when Bishop Bola focused on issues such as a proposal for a harsh Christian Personal Status Law making divorce virtually impossible and thus blocking possibilities for remarriage. The agenda of Bishop Bola did not represent the hopes of the Christians. This furthered the fears of the Copts of being isolated from the real citizens of Egypt.

There is a trend among Islamists of being involved in the increasing disappearance of Christian girls, the continuation of assaults on the houses and the properties of Christians, burning churches, forceful displacement of Christians out of their homes followed by urfi (customary law) sessions that result in more injustice and pressuring the Christians in their daily life activities. This has become a routine in daily Christian life in many villages and suburbs of Egypt.

Christians then began to scream (in Arabic: “sarkha”) during Christian protests.  In these marches they asked the state for more consideration and care for the urgent issues concerning the life and the pride of the Christians, but all activities had thus far been in vain.  Michail Armanius, the founder of the Sarkha movment, is one of the young men who had taken part in all of the demonstrations that happened since January 25, 2011 and on July 3, 2013, his dream was realized.

In the first week after Morsi’s ouster, the army of Egypt stated that they can never fail the dreams of all Egyptians or neglect the suffering of the Egyptian people with a regime that separates the unity of Egypt giving hope to Armanius and many other Christian Egyptians.  From this, however, arose the calling for a new constitution and the state preferring the Church to be the sole representative of the Christians despite the refusal expressed by the majority of the Christians who wished the Church to be involved in spiritual issues only and for politics to be left to the politicians.

Again, we see a glimpse of the vanishing dreams of the Christians whose dreams were reduced by the codes that concern the Church authority and leadership. This adds legality and validity to the Sarkha movement, following the full negligence of the state of Christian Egyptians, while claiming full equality and citizenship for all Egyptians. The calls for Sarkha (which in practice means demonstrating) should continue until the constitution is completed and state and church have responded to the real demands of Christians, asking for separation of church and state, instead of dividing the views of the Christian members of the Constituent Assembly into views representing the church and Christians as Egyptian citizens.