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Title: Review: Hans Jansen’s “Religious Roots of Muslim Violence” with questions for Muslim scholars

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Our [November 4 review](#) of Prof. Hans Jansen’s article “Copts” in *Hoeiboel*, on October 14th led Jansen to write that “Most arguments in defence of Islam are known in The Netherlands for what they are, it makes little sense to repeat these another time. With best wishes, Hans Jansen.” [In Dutch: De meeste argumenten ter verdediging van de islam zijn in Nederland inmiddels wel al gezien voor wat ze zijn, het heeft weinig zin om die nog eens te laten herhalen. Met vriendelijkegroet, HansJansen.]

Prof. Wolfram Reiss, University of Vienna, responded: “Congratulations, your article is wonderful. I read the [biography of Muhammad](#) Jansen wrote. It is awful full of polemics. It is full of destruction of al-Sīrah al-Nabawīyyah, but on the other side, he does not have any other alternative. The summary of Jansen’s work is: Nobody knows anything about Muhammad because everything is wrong in al-Sīrah. Of course there are good critical remarks which should be considered, but on the other side he does not show any other perspective to deal with the biography. “

Jansen has focused his entire life on the study of the Qur’ān, Muhammad, and radical Islam. He strongly criticized Islam Basher Pim Fortuyn, who was murdered by an animal rights extremist in 2002. Jansen changed his views when he discovered that radical Muslim ideologies argued for jihād against what they called the “Western enemy”.

The murder of Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh in 2004 was a major turning point for Jansen. Jansen had known van Gogh personally and whatever one thinks of van Gogh’s extreme offensive language against religions in general, including Islam, murdering him was a shock that brought home that radical Muslim ideologies could also cause death and destruction in the West. Jansen formulated this shock into the following words:

In the eyes of Americans it may not be appropriate to compare the assassination of one individual artist with an attack that took thousands of lives. However, the assassination of Theo van Gogh had a deeper effect on Dutch society than any large-scale operation could possibly have had. Murdering Van Gogh brought home eloquently that in the Netherlands free speech on Islam would not be allowed any longer. Victims of 9/11 were, in a way, accidental. It was a terrible fate, but it could have befallen anybody

irrespective of the opinions he had uttered about Islam. [Johannes J.G. Jansen](#), [‘Religious Roots of Muslim Violence,’ 2011.](#)

Jansen has become more polemic, which has made him a great hero in Western anti-Muslim circles. At the same time, he has come under frequent verbal attacks, which may have increased his polemic tone. In his polemics, he tends to overlook non-religious factors that also play a role in the violence we witness. He also tends to overlook the context of things reported, partly because he has been misinformed through media reporting. His comments in *Hoeiboel* on church building were a case in point. Yes, there are problems with church building, but there are also instances that churches are built or restored without problems. The media tends to focus on the negative—on problems with church building, while locations where there have been no problems were simply not reported.

In my view, Jansen is raising important questions to which I would like to see Muslims respond. I thus formulated this text on November 23rd adding questions to Muslim scholars and sent it to some friends of mine who, unfortunately, did not find the time to respond. This text is thus placed in *Arab-West Report* with the questions to Muslim scholars. I am pleased that Jayson Casper, however, found time to respond.

Of course responding to Jansen’s lengthy text requires much time and *Arab-West Report* does not have the funding to pay Muslim scholars for their responses unless we have a donor paying for this. It would seem to be of greater interest to Muslim organizations to respond then to Western organizations. I believe leaving the arguments of Jansen unanswered would make the arguments of Jansen appear to be credible, which in turn will add to widespread Western fear of Islam. Unfortunately, it is a fact that there is religiously motivated violence justified on the basis of Qur’ān, hadīth, shari’ah and texts of Muslim religious scholars. It is also a fact that many Muslims oppose such religiously motivated violence. Muslims are well aware that radicals exist who use Muslim religious texts to justify their violence and intolerance. It is important that they oppose such beliefs. It is also important that both Muslim and non-Muslim readers see that there is a sincere Muslim effort to oppose religiously-motivated violence. Both Muslims and Western media could do a better job in reporting this opposition. Media need to do a better job because they tend to highlight sensational news—attacks, radicalism, disasters, and hardly give attention to the positive in society, nor is much effort made to dig into the background of many stories. Still, Muslims also need to do a better job because they cannot blame Westerners for being uninformed if they have not provided responses to Western claims.

I have reviewed the literature list of various Western reports on the Muslim and Arab world and often found it not surprising that they reached the conclusions they did with their sources. This

is partly due to a lack of sources that report responses to extremist explanations of Islamic scriptures. Thus more effort is needed to address the questions raised. This will show that Muslims, just as people of any other belief or conviction, are not a monolithic bloc and we should distinguish between radicals and others.

I believe that Muslims should respond to questions Jansen raises, but that Jansen should, in turn, be ready to consider Muslim arguments. Jansen claims in his writings that all standard and authoritative Muslim commentaries on the Qur'ān claim that Qur'ān 2:256 [Sahih International Translation], “There shall be no compulsion in [acceptance of] the religion,” is abrogated and no longer valid. Prof. Hasan Wajīh and Imām Fādil Sulaymān responded in 2008 to his arguments, contending that this peaceful verse is not abrogated and listed commentaries that argue for the validity of this verse for Muslim-non-Muslim relations today. I then expected Jansen to respond to this, but he did not and continued writing his own texts in full disregard of what Wajīh and Sulaymān had written. Of course *Arab-West Report* is not a major academic publication, but it would have been more considerate if Jansen would have responded to the arguments of Professor Hasan Wajīh and Imām Fādil Sulaymān.

I have responded on *Hoeiboel*, but responding to texts on this blog is wasted effort. Anyone making any point of critique gets immediately verbally attacked by Jansen's supporters who do not hesitate to use deeply offensive language, killing any dialogue. I would like to continue arguing for the need for sincere dialogue and thus summarized Jansen's recent text, “Religious Roots of Muslim Violence,” for *Arab-West Report*. The summary highlights the points that many people in the West believe to be essential teachings of Islam—a consequence of the writings of people like Jansen. I believe Muslim scholars need to respond to Jansen's various arguments. I hope Jansen will seriously consider their arguments and respond. I also hope this could form the basis of a public discussion between Jansen and Muslim scholars on the issue of “Religious Roots of Muslim Violence”.

Review of Johannes J.G. Jansen, “Religious Roots of Muslim Violence,” in: Geliijn MOLIER, Afshin ELLIAN & David SUURLAND, eds., *Terrorism: Ideology, Law and Policy*, Dordrecht 2011, pp. 165-185. Text in Word: Click [here](#)

Where Jansen wrote “Koran” and “Sharia” I changed this to Qur'ān and Sharī'ah to make it match the transliteration system of *Arab-West Report*. Jansen writes the word “cleric” for Muslim religious scholars, which is not ideal to use, but after stating this he nevertheless uses it rather than repeating longer phrases. I am providing a summary of Jansen's arguments. In

between answers are provided to his arguments as well as questions I hope Muslim scholars will respond to.

Prof. Hans Jansen argues that many acts of violence are carried out by Muslims; many are engaged in fights against injustice.

All of these acts of resistance, or terrorism, may be reasonably explained by local history or local social circumstances. They may even be perfectly justifiable. This needs to be researched seriously and extensively. Such research should definitely not be omitted or be neglected, no matter how enormous the task will be.

I am glad Jansen notes this and I wish more research would be directed to this subject.

But circumstantial reasons alone are not sufficient to explain Islamic violence. Jansen writes:

Islamic doctrine and ideology have profound influence on Muslims, whatever their individual social or other circumstances. The only reason for this is that Muslims tend to take Islam seriously indeed. Other explanations may be interesting but they are easily falsifiable: not all poverty, for instance, translates itself into fanaticism, fundamentalism or terrorism. Certain religious commands, however, will do so eventually. If this is true, it becomes important to find out what these commands are, in which holy texts or in which sermons a believer hears of them, and who encourages his fellow Muslims to obey such commands.

It is true that not all poverty or other social injustices translate in fanaticism, fundamentalism, or terrorism, but neither does the Qur'ān, hadīth, nor Sharī'ah make each Muslim believer a fanatic, fundamentalist, or a terrorist. I have lived in Egypt for many years and have worked with Muslims who were both dedicated believers and very peaceful. Hugh Goddard also describes these differences in [“Muslim Perceptions of Christianity” \(1996\)](#).

It is thus easy to turn around Jansen's words and state that blaming particular Islamic texts “may be interesting but they are easily falsifiable.” It is, in my opinion, important to study all factors, including both social and other circumstances as well as when, in such circumstances, Muslims turn to radical explanations of their own religious texts.

Jansen argues that in the West laws are manmade and because they are human creations they can be changed, but this is distinct from the Islamic teaching “that the rules and provisions of

Sharī'ah law are identical to God's will, and have to be obeyed.” What would happen if God's will is not obeyed?

Jansen then provides an example:

The penalty that the Sharī'ah prescribes for leaving Islam is death. This sentence has preferably to be pronounced by a court, but even without a clear court decision to this effect, a religious enthusiast may mete out the death penalty informally as happened to the liberal Muslim intellectual Faraj Fudah.

The prestigious Egyptian cleric Shaykh Muhammad al-Ghazālī was consulted as an expert on Sharī'ah law when the assassin of Faraj Fudah stood trial in 1993. To the amazement of many, the expert declared in court that according to Islamic law killing an apostate should not be judged to constitute the crime of murder.

The Egyptian writer Faraj Fudah had been killed informally in the summer of 1992 for his alleged apostasy from Islam, see Jansen's *The Dual Nature of Islamic Fundamentalism*, London 1997, p. 170-171. In his expert testimony, the learned Shaykh actually used the word *iftiyaat*, 'offense', and added that he did not believe Islam had a punishment in store for people guilty of this 'offense'.

Why did a Muslim “religious enthusiast” kill Faraj Fudah? “Do Muslims who commit acts of terrorism perhaps feel that they are simply carrying out the commands of their God?” Jansen asks.

Questions for Muslim scholars:

- 1) Is it allowed for an individual Muslim to kill an apostate?
- 2) What do you think of al-Ghazālī's statement in court? It is correct that al-Ghazālī used the word *iftiyaat*?
- 3) Did other Muslim scholars of Islam publicly criticize al-Ghazālī for his effort to reduce the seriousness of the murder and thus reduce the sentence of the assassin? Could you list some publications that critique al-Ghazālī's statement?
- 4) I remember a discussion in Arab media in the late nineties when the Islamic Research Academy ruled (or discussed?) that apostates could not be punished by humans in their lifetime but could only be punished by God in the life hereafter. What happened to this discussion that then took place? The late Grand Shaykh Tantāwī then said in an interview I conducted that a Muslim is allowed to convert, but he cannot speak about this publicly. This touches free speech. How do we deal with an apostate who decides to go public such as Māhir Juharī?

In principle, Islamic teachings have as much moral authority as Catholic teachings, Jansen writes. However, Islam possesses, according to Jansen, something which the churches have not, or not any longer: men willing to kill and fight for it. A number of Muslims who take Islam seriously are not only willing to kill but also ready to die for it because they believe they are carrying out God's commands as they believe are stipulated in the four pillars of the Sharī'ah: Qur'ān, hadīth, analogy, and consensus.

Qur'ān

Jansen correctly states that "It is probable that some of these warlike passages from the Qur'ān are not meant as general commands, but refer to specific military situations that existed during Muhammad's lifetime."

The heart of the problem is that many Muslim believers see Qur'ānic texts as outside the context of the time in which they were written and see them as eternal words of God with no context, thus giving the literal text validity for believers that need to execute them as such. I had an argument about this in spring 2010 with Omar, a 15-year old Dutch Moroccan kid, in a religious education class at a school in Pijnacker. Omar simply refused to accept that the Qur'ānic text could have a context. He clearly stated that he abides by the teaching of his pious grandfather who taught him that the Qur'ānic text needs to be understood literally in all periods of time.

The problem, Jansen writes, is not the original intentions, but how "these passages are understood by large numbers of Muslims." Jansen presumes to know how most Muslims think because he believes that the well-known Muslim Qur'ān commentary by Al-Jalalayn "represents standard Muslim opinion."

In the words of Al-Jalalayn and other commentaries, Jansen writes, Qur'ānic commands addressing violence are linguistically crystal clear. There is very little to interpret in the case of a text that says 'kill them wherever you find them' (e.g., Qur'ān 2:191, 4:89, 4:91, and 9:5).

Such verses from the Qur'ān are widely understood as a licence to kill unbelievers if, and this is a conditional clause, this can be done without too much cost to the Muslim community.

Questions to Muslim scholars:

5) Do Al-Jalalayn and other commentators provide such literal interpretations of the text of the Qur'ān?

- 6) Could you provide the names of well-known commentators that clearly explain that these verses refer to specific circumstances that existed during Muhammad's lifetime AND that they thus have no literal relevance for believers today.
- 7) How influential is Al-Jalalayn in Islamic studies and in making sermons? What are the circles where al-Jalalayn is used?

Jansen then lists other verses that are in his view widely understood by Muslims as a license to kill unbelievers:

Qur'an 9:30, at the end of the verse, contains a curse: God announces that He wishes people who believe that Jesus Christ is the Son of God to be killed in battle. Its text is completely unambiguous: '*q'Atālahum Allah*' that is translated with 'May Allah destroy them!'

Question to Muslim scholars:

- 8) See also the original text of Jansen where he provides more detail. What commentary (or commentaries) would provide a different interpretation of this verse and how does that interpretation read? Could you provide a reference to those commentaries that provide different interpretations?

Jansen lists more verses:

'Fighting is prescribed for you', Qur'an 2:216, cannot be misunderstood. Neither can 9:111, 'They fight in the cause of Allah; they kill and are killed'. It is interesting to note that in the first verse of these two fragments, 2:216, the Muslims are referred to as 'you', and in the second one, 9:111, as 'they'. This, however, does not make the message of these verses less menacing. It is, according to the Qur'an, moreover entirely reasonable that Muslims fight the Unbelievers, because 'there is sickness in their hearts', 2:10. And: 'Urge on the Believers to fight!', 8:65. Verse 4:74 is clear: 'Let them fight in the way of God... Whosoever fights in the way of God and is slain, or conquers, We [God] shall bring him a mighty wage'. Someone who is not convinced by these verses will not be convinced by more or even much more of the same.

Question to Muslim scholars:

9) What commentary (ies) would provide different interpretations of these verses and how do those interpretations read? Could you provide a reference to those commentaries that provide different interpretations?

“Let there be no compulsion in religion”

“Apologists for Islam argue every now and then that the relations between Muslims and others are not regulated by these bloodthirsty passages, but by Qur’ān 109:5, ‘Ye have your religion, and I have mine,’ and 2:256, ‘Let there be no compulsion in religion’. It is awkward to have to contradict this,” Jansen writes, “since it would be a great step forward if it were true.”

All standard and authoritative Muslim commentaries on the Qur’ān, without exception, including Al-Jalalayn (he added in an e-mail in 2008), hold these two peaceful and reassuring fragments to be repealed and “abrogated” by the later “verse of the sword,” Qur’ān 9:5, which argues that Muslims should “slay the idolators” and “lie in wait for them at every place of ambush,” but if they capitulate and become Muslims, “God is All-forgiving”.

Jansen repeats prior arguments in his text to which Imām Fādil Sulaymān and Dr. Hasan Wajīh responded in *Arab-West Report* in 2008.

Where Jansen states that “all” standard and authoritative Muslim commentaries on the Qur’ān, without exception, hold these two peaceful and reassuring fragments to be repealed and “abrogated,” Imām Fādil Sulaymān states that early scholars as Ibn ‘Abās, Mujāhid, Q’Atāda, and Abū Ja’far Al-Nahās view that verse 2:256 “Let there be no compulsion in religion” is NOT abrogated, but it is only applied on the people of the book who live in Muslim lands. Moreover, al-Tabarī views that 2:256 is even not confined to the people of the book but considers the verse a general one. Many details about this refutation of the belief that this verse is abrogated can be found in the writings of Al-Dahāk and ‘Atā Ibn Ābī Rabāh.

Al-Qaradāwī, Sulaymān states, follows the same view as Al-Tabarī. Qutb reconciles between verses 2:256 and 9:5, saying that 2:256 is applied on individuals, i.e. no one can force individuals to convert to Islam, while 9:5 or any other “verses of the sword” is applied to remove any barrier hindering people from knowing about Islam and choosing their religion freely. It is true some scholars considered verse 2:256 as completely abrogated. Their understanding is based on the fact that 9:5 was revealed after 2:256. Yet their opponents say, as explained above, that there is no contradiction between the two verses (<http://>

www.arabwestreport.info/year-2008/week-49/7-no-compulsion-religion-abrogated-dr-Hasan-Wajih-responds-dr-hans-jansen).

Dr. Hasan Wajih, also rejects Qur'anic interpretations that claim that verse 2:256 is abrogated and refers to other scholars (<http://www.arabwestreport.info/year-2008/week-49/6-no-compulsion-religion-abrogated-responding-dr-hans-jansen>).

Jansen's claim that "all standard and authoritative Muslim commentaries on the Qur'an, without exception, hold these two peaceful and reassuring fragments to be repealed and 'abrogated'" thus seems to be hard to maintain. Rather it seems that Muslims are divided about this issue.

Heaping abuse on non-believers:

The Qur'an heaps abuse upon Jews ("pigs", 5:60) and on non-Muslims in general: "the worst of beasts," (verse 8:55) Jansen writes. Such verbal abuse is called dehumanization, yet this is the picture the Qur'an offers (e.g., 2:65, 5:60, 7:166, 8:55, 74:50). It is actually a minor miracle that relations between Muslims and non-Muslims are what they are. "This can only mean that Muslims are more humane than Islam itself," Jansen concludes. **Or does he miss other well-known Muslim commentators?**

For Jansen, however, it is clear that an enemy about whom Islam teaches that God himself calls him an ape, a donkey, a swine, a dog, or just an animal, has no human rights. It is only proper to terrorize such subhuman non-persons.

Question to Muslim scholars:

10) How do commentaries of the Qur'an explain these words as pigs and worst of beasts? Could you provide references to those commentaries?

It is true that the Bible, too, contains strong qualifications of individuals but "churches and synagogues," Jansen writes, "have since long understood such passages as specific, not valid for all times and all places." Thus the problem with the above mentioned texts in the Qur'an is that standard commentators such as Al-Jalalayn explain these passages as general commands instead of limiting them to time and place, thus placing them in the context of the time the verses were revealed.

Question to Muslim scholars:

11) This is again the problem with the literal interpretation of the Qur'ānic text and seeing this as general commands instead of limiting them to time and place. How do Muslim scholars deal with the question when a particular text should be read as a general commend and when should be limited to time and place?

Assassination of rulers (Qur'ān: 5:44):

Rulers who do not use their authority to enforce the laws of God are called *Kufār*, or “pagans”. A Muslim who becomes one of the *Kufār* is generally understood to have committed the crime of apostasy from Islam, which has to be punished by death. This understanding of the verse was formulated in Ibn Kathir’s commentary of the Qur’ān (ca. 1300-1375 AD). Ibn Kathir’s commentary is widely read and studied even today. The duty to kill a ruler who does not apply Sharī’ah law in full became the central argument in the pamphlet written by the men who in 1981 assassinated the Egyptian President Sadāt. The pamphlet was entitled *Al-Farīdah al-Ghā’ibah*, or “The Neglected Duty”. The duty neglected was waging Jihād against impious rulers. Jansen described their pamphlet in detail in: J.J.G. Jansen, *The Neglected Duty: the Creed of Sadāt's Assassins and Islamic Resurgence in the Middle East*, London/New York (Macmillan) 1986, 246 pp.

Rulers’ “lackeys” may also be targeted. Not resisting the apostate ruler is taken as a sign of their own apostasy. This constitutes a threat to anybody who works for the “apostate” government, in whatever capacity. Jansen studied the texts of Algerian radicals in the 1990s who then explained “that Sharī’ah law sees the wives of such apostate policemen as deserving the death penalty: Sharī’ah law does not allow Muslim women to remain married to a non-Muslim.”

Others who understood Qur’ān 5: 44 as a license to kill are Dr. ‘Umar ‘Abd al-Rahmān, involved in the 1993 terrorist actions against the World Trade Centre and the United Nations buildings in New York; Abū al-‘Ilā Al-Mawdūdī (1903-1979), the ideologist behind the foundation of Pakistan; and the Egyptian writer Sayyīd Qutb, who was hanged in Cairo in 1966.

The problem with these three men, Jansen writes, is that they cannot be seen as a few isolated radicals but “all three men are immensely popular and widely read.”

Questions to Muslim scholars:

12) In what circles, political parties and organizations are these people “immensely popular”? Could you list names of parties, organizations and people?

13) Who are the Islamic scholars who have criticized them and where was this published?

On January 3, 1982, not long after the assassination of Sadāt, Shaykh Jād al-Haq ‘Alī Jād al-Haq, then Rector of the Azhar University in Cairo, gave a fatwa stating that Qur’ān 5:44 addressed the Jews in Medina and is not about ruling. His explanation was challenged by the blind Shaykh ‘Abd al-Hamid Kishk, an extremely popular Egyptian preacher at that time, who combined both the traditional and the liberal interpretation of the verse, agreeing that the verse addresses the Jews and talks about mediating but he then asks, if God told the Jews to mediate according to Jewish religious law, how much more would Muslims be expected to arrange their affairs in accordance with God’s will, i.e. the Sharī’ah? Without denying the specific background of the verse, he nevertheless managed to impose its traditional understanding: a ruler who deviates in any way from God’s laws (as understood by Muslims) is not a Muslim any longer, with all the consequences this entails.

It is a common belief that rulers who are lax in applying Sharī’ah law are apostates, Jansen states and, “It has been so for centuries.” Shaykh Kishk, Jansen states, once again illustrated this belief “that 5:44 instructs believers to assassinate Muslim political leaders when these do not apply Sharī’ah law in all its details.”

Not every Muslims feels that this verse addresses him personally. But it is not difficult to understand that an activist (who is familiar with this theory since childhood) may come to believe it has started to apply to him personally. He may then initiate action and become a terrorist.

Question to Muslim scholars:

14) In what circles (can you name current political parties and other organizations) do people believe that Qur’ān 5: 44 should be understood as a license to kill rulers who do not use their authority to have the laws of God applied? What is the influence of Shaykh Kishk? In what circles was he popular?

Terrorism

A number of Muslims takes Qur'ān 8:60 as a command to terrorize non-Muslims. The verse actually uses the word *turhibūnah*, which in Modern Standard Arabic definitely means “you terrorize”. Jansen provides in his text a number of translations that all provide the same meaning. The word “terrorism” is a modern word and using this word in a Qur'ān translation would look anachronistic, but, Jansen states “many modern Muslims definitely understand it as such.”

The late Muhammad Sayyīd Tantāwī, widely seen in the West as a [moderate Muslim scholar](#), explains Qur'ānic verse 8:60 in his Qur'ān commentary, published in Cairo, 1992 (when he was muftī of Egypt), vl. 6, pp. 139-144, stating that this verse orders the believers to sow fear and confusion in the minds of the unbelievers:

First of all (*'alaara'sha'ula' gamii'an*) the pagans of Mecca who expelled [the Muslims] from [their] houses, and the Jews of Medina who leave nothing undone that might harm [the Muslims] (p. 140).

With the expression “first of all,” Jansen explains:

Tantāwī combines the specific and the general meaning of the verse, teaching that this verse is not specific to exclusively the situation which existed during the lifetime of Muhammad but that its meaning is more general, and includes modern, contemporary ‘enemies of God and Islam’, whether ‘unbeliever, polytheist or heretic’, *kullkaafirwa-mushrikwa-mun Harif*. Readers of Arabic Islamic texts know that ‘polytheist’, *mushrik*, is often used to refer to Christians since Christianity believes in the Trinity, which, according to Islamic doctrine, is a form of polytheism. Fear has to be put in the hearts of all these people. What better way to make people live in terror of Islam than terrorism?”

In the film *Fitna* of Dutch Member of Parliament Geert Wilders a professional Egyptian Qur'ān reciter chants a number of verses from the Qur'ān. Amongst these is verse 8:60, whereby the speaker repeats the word *turhibūnah*, “you terrorize”. Why would the speaker repeat this word? “There can be no other reason,” Jansen explains, “than that this professional Qur'ān reciter desires his fellow Muslims to pay extra attention to what is widely being understood as a Qur'ānic call for terrorism against non-Muslims.”

In 2008, we searched for [all references in Arab media to Qur'ānic references](#) that were used in the period 1997-2008. Of the over 2,000 references 11 referred to surah 8:60 and none of these articles, written by Muslims for Muslims, were calling for terrorism. One article is of particular importance. Dr. al-Qaradāwī was addressing Egyptian readers through *'Aqīdatī* (Egyptian Islamic weekly newspaper) on February 25, 2003 (AWR, 2003, week 9, art. 16), shortly after the American led invasion of Iraq in 2003. Muslims can be only victorious, he wrote, if they are obedient to God. The lesson is clear. Saddām Husayn's army was no match for the Americans, but he was at the time also not considered to be a Muslim believer. Al-Qaradāwī is clear about who the enemy is. He mentions Zionists in the article, but with Arab television programs showing those days that Americans were invading Iraq, there is no doubt he believed Americans were instigated by Zionists. This reflects an often-heard theory in the Arab world that the Zionist lobby is so strong in the U.S. that it can even move American decision makers to invade Iraq. Al-Qaradāwī voiced his anger about the weaknesses of Muslims for lack of faith and called for more obedience to God, but did not call for the use of terror.

The film *Fitna* was strongly criticized by [Dr. Hasan Wajīh](#) and Imām [Fādīl Sulaymān](#) for taking Qur'ānic verses out of context.

But where these two Muslim religious scholars strongly oppose calls to violence based on what they argue to be a mistaken interpretation of Qur'ānic verses Samīr 'Azūz and Muhammad Bouyeri, two young Dutch/Moroccan terrorists believed that it was the word *turhibūnah*, “you terrorize,” in Qur'ān 8:60 that made them see the light. But both young men know only a little Arabic and thus Jansen asks, “Who coached Samīr 'Azūz and Muhammad Būwayrī into believing that the Qur'ān prescribes terrorism? Morally, such a person is as guilty of their crimes as these two young men are themselves.”

Here, I fully agree with Jansen that the people who coached both young men in this belief are equally guilty.

The connection between radical theories on “fighting the unbelievers” and actual acts of terrorism is a given fact. Nidāl Mālik Hasan, a military psychiatrist of Palestinian origin with the rank of major, shot and killed thirteen unarmed military men while shouting *Allahu Akbar*, “God is the greatest” in November 2009. The day before the shootings he had emptied his apartment “since he would not return”. His killing was thus premeditated. Many people believed this was an isolated case, not connected to Islamic teaching, but Jansen doubts this.

The standard Muslim denial and defence

The standard Muslim defence is:

- That ‘the Qur’ān is a book of peace and to understand it as inciting to violence is just a malicious misinterpretation.
- Non-Muslims should not to base their opinions on clerical statements. “The clerics are not the people”!
- Stating that much violence was expressed and carried out by “inexperienced young men who may not even know Arabic and hence cannot even read the Qur’ān.”

It makes little difference to the victim, Jansen argues, whether the killer is experienced or not and whether or not he is able to read Qur’ānic Arabic. In order to be (mis)led, it is not necessary to be able to read. Quite the opposite is true.

All these types of defence nevertheless have their merit, and they even may be true in part, Jansen states. But when:

- (i) the plain literal meaning of text of the Qur’ān,
- (ii) statements by authoritative influential professional religious leaders, and
- (iii) statements originating with convicted terrorists

all point in the same direction, the world definitely has a problem.

Arguments from Muhammad’s life and sayings (hadīth)

Jansen doubts the historical merit of events mentioned in the *hadīth* and thus the stories about and attributed to the Prophet Muhammad. Major reasons for his doubts are:

- 1) The Prophet’s sayings and acts (hadīth) are based on biographies like the one by Ibn Ishāq, ca. 750, and canonical collections of his sayings and instructions like the ones compiled by Al-Bukhārī and Muslim, both ca. 860 AD. All these sources were written down late, more than a century after the death of Muhammad.
- 2) In the hadīth he reads claims related to the political struggles within the Islamic empire of the first centuries, thus certain ahadīth were very beneficial to people supporting certain political positions in their days.
- 3) Lack of trust in the oral narration of the ahadīth.

Jansen has described his doubts in two major books:

De historische Muhammad: De Mekkaanse verhalen, Amsterdam (Arbeiderspers) 2005, 238 pp.

De historische Muhammad: De verhalen uit Medina, Amsterdam (Arbeiderspers) 2007, 320 pp. Both books were translated and published in [German](#) but unfortunately, his books are not (yet?) available in English.

But for the average Muslim these doubts are not relevant. He will not doubt the historicity of what are called “authentic” ahadīth, nor is he inclined, Jansen writes, to make a distinction between the contents of the Qur’ān and the contents of the traditional authoritative standard commentaries. Muslims, he writes, rarely realize that their information (on, e.g., the battle of Badr, on the year of Muhammad’s birth, on his having been an orphan, etc.) is derived from commentaries, not from the Qur’ān itself. Believers need to know that these commentaries have developed later in history, often centuries away from the events they describe and therefore lack historical accuracy, even if the Qur’ān might be infallible.

The “good examples” that have “to be followed in all its details” include, according to the above mentioned biographies and canonical collections, that

Muhammad and his men raided their neighbours, captured these, and sold them into slavery. Muhammad and his men robbed travellers and caravans, and assassinated critics of their behaviour. According to the Muslim sources themselves, Muhammad and his men migrated from Mecca to Medina, but once there they rewarded the inhabitants of Medina by killing a large number of them. These sources themselves report how Muhammad beheaded 700 Medinese Jews, on the flimsiest of excuses. His contemporaries and later Muslim historians were embarrassed about this behaviour.

Muhammad, according to these sources, also stated:

I have been commanded that I should fight people till they bear witness that there is no God but Allah and keep up prayer and pay zakat [‘contribute to the war chest’, i.e., capitulate and become Muslim]. When they do this, their blood and their property shall be safe with me.’ This last phrase means ‘when they surrender and become Muslim they will not be killed and robbed’.

It would be better if such texts were read with the understanding that they have no historical basis and were composed in later years to serve the political interests of parties then interested in seeing such claims attributed to the Prophet Muhammad.

Wafā' Sultān was born and educated in Syria. She studied medicine there, migrated to the United States and became a psychiatrist. She quoted an excerpt attributed to the Prophet:

An impostor, the Antichrist, will come along and claim to be the Messiah. Seventy thousand Jews will follow him, each girl with a sword. But the Messiah will catch [the Antichrist], kill him, and defeat all the Jews. Each and every stone and tree will say: "Oh servants of Allah, Oh Muslim, here is a Jew hiding behind me, come and kill him". Etcetera.

The sayings on Christianity and Christians are not reassuring either. For Jansen, it is clear that these ancient texts are anti-Semitic or anti-Christian and that such incitements constitute a threat to Western, open societies as long as Muslims believe that these are true historical facts and examples that need to be followed.

Question to Muslim scholars:

15) How would you respond to these references in biographies and canonical collections?

Arguments from Islamic Sharī'ah law

Jansen: "Next to the Qur'ān and the way it is generally understood, and the example of Muhammad as officially codified, and transmitted by Muslims to Muslims, we have to take into account the system of Islamic Sharī'ah law as a third religious factor inductive to terrorist behaviour."

Islamic law is not codified the way most Western systems have been under the influence of Napoleon (d. 1821). This makes it difficult if not impossible for outsiders to find the exact ruling that the Sharī'ah prescribes, Jansen writes.

This difficulty explains much of the fear of Egyptians, mostly Christian and liberal Muslims, to a more strict application of the Sharī'ah in Egyptian law which was obvious in a [media discussion on article 2 of the Egyptian constitution in 2007](#).

The absence of codifications creates the need to consult a qualified, professional Muslim scholar specialized in the matter, Jansen writes. This need for help produces a dependence on such men that many would deem to be unhealthy. Nevertheless, both Muslims and non-Muslims living under conditions that impose Muslim Sharī'ah law, have incessantly to consult such experts. This gives these men great power.

Governments in Islamic countries are not always happy about the scope of this power, and try to control the members of the guild of Sharī'ah experts as tightly as possible.

Sharī'ah law, hence, is not codified, and according to most experts it even cannot be codified and thus explanations remain the prerogative of Muslim scholars.

Questions to Muslim scholars:

16) Is it true that Sharī'ah law cannot be codified?

17) Could you provide a reference to authoritative texts that reassure freedom of expression and freedom for non-Muslims living under Sharī'ah law?

One handbook in English, made by an American convert to Islam who calls himself Nuh Ha Mim Keller: The Reliance of the Traveller, Beltsville (Maryland) 1991 and several reprints, 22 + 1238 pages, was endorsed by the Azhar University, the most prestigious centre of Islamic learning in the world. It stated that this book is “conform to the practice and the faith of the orthodox Sunni community,” *muwaafaqa li-manhagwa-'aqiid'Atāhl al-sunnawa-l-gamaa 'a*.

Keller writes:

Jihād means to go to war against non-Muslims (...). The scriptural basis for jihād (...) is such Qur'ānic verses as: (1) 'Fighting is prescribed for you' (Qur'ān 2:216); (2) 'Slay them wherever you find them' (Qur'ān 4:89); (3) 'Fight the idolators utterly' (Qur'ān 9:36); and such hadīths as the one related by Bukhari and Muslim that the Prophet (Allah bless him and give him peace) said 'I have been commanded to fight people until they testify that there is no god but Allah and that Muhammad is the Messenger of Allah' (...) and the hadīth reported by Muslim 'To go forth in the morning or evening to fight in the path of Allah is better than the whole world and everything in it.'

Details concerning jihād are found in the military expeditions of the Prophet (Allah bless him and give him peace), including his own martial forays and those on which he

dispatched others. The former consist of the ones he personally attended, some twenty-seven (others say twenty-nine) of them. (p. 599-600)

This is not about spiritual warfare, Jansen states. This is about warfare.

Jihād is a communal obligation. When enough people perform it to successfully accomplish it, it is no longer obligatory upon others (...). If none of those concerned perform jihād, and it does not happen at all, then everyone who is aware that it is obligatory is guilty of sin, if there was a possibility of having performed it. (...)

There are two possible states in respect to non-Muslims. The first is when they are in their own countries, in which case jihād is a communal obligation (...) upon Muslims each year.

The second state is when non-Muslims invade a Muslim country or near to one, in which case jihād is personally obligatory. (p. 600)

This is followed by paragraphs on “The rules of warfare” (p. 603-604), “Truces” (p. 604-605) and “Spoils of Battle” (p. 606). It is hard to imagine that this is about “spiritual warfare”. It should, moreover, be noted that waging war is obligatory both when non-Muslims are “in their own countries,” and when they are not. This, one must conclude, means that warfare is always obligatory.

Question to Muslim scholars:

18) How could the Azhar have officially endorsed this book?

Tactics

Jansen writes that Muslims are allowed to lie about their real religious intentions:

In the opinion of some Islamic religious authorities, Muslims have the right, or the duty, to be careful about divulging these warlike aspirations, and are at liberty to practice ‘prudence’ or ‘dissimulation’ of their real convictions and aspirations. The Arabic word here is *taqiyya*, often understood as ‘lying’ but in reality ‘caution’.

For this reason, Jansen writes,

Muslims preserve a certain reticence about the Islamic enmity against the West, and about the commands to use violence that the Islamic religious tradition issues to Muslims. It is, of course, known to them that the Qur'ān, the Hadīth collections, sermons in the mosque and the Sharī'ah handbooks all order the judicious application of violence, and can easily be understood to do much more than that. This obviously may result in senseless terrorism.

The problem of *taqiyya* is that lying is religiously justified. Another problem is that these accusations of *taqiyya* seem to be recent. I remember my classes on Islam with Jansen in the late 1970s at Leiden University when he taught that *taqiyya* was a Shi'ite concept. Yet now also Sunni Muslims are accused of adhering to this principle.

Claiming that Muslims have the right to *taqiyya* means for many that Muslim eirenic responses to Western questions never can be trusted. For many Islamophobes this means dialogue is useless. They probably do not realize that in all societies people lie. One obvious lie was when the pious President George Bush who prayed so much claimed that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction which he used to make fellow Americans and European allies believe that the invasion of Iraq in 2003 was a necessity. But after Iraq had been conquered, these weapons of mass destruction were not only never found, but the alleged "proof" had never existed.

Trust comes in any society when words meet deeds. But if words are not trusted and people do not see deeds because they do not live in a Muslim country and have Muslim friends, then this indeed becomes a most disturbing claim.

Questions to Muslim scholars:

19) Can you comment on the concept of *taqiyya*?

20) Jansen's comment on Qur'ān, hadīth collections, and Sharī'ah handbooks have already been mentioned but do sermons in mosques in general order to apply violence in line with what Jansen stated in his article?

The duty of Jihād

However this all may be, Jihād is, in principle, a collective duty, Jansen states. The last example of Jihād waged by an Islamic state is the siege of Vienna in 1683. For three centuries no Jihād was waged, but recently individual Muslims and Muslim NGOs like Al-Qā'idah have

taken up engaging in Jihād, but now as an individual duty. States may have facilitated such Jihādist activities, but they can easily deny having done so even if they did. Such denial would certainly be in the best interest of their self-preservation (*taqiyya*).

Jansen provides the following examples of individual jihād: the attack on the World Trade Center and Pentagon in the United States, September 11, 2001, and the assassination of the Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh in Amsterdam, on November 2, 2004.

Murdering Van Gogh brought home eloquently that in the Netherlands free speech on Islam would not be allowed any longer. The assassin targeted someone who had spoken freely about Islam, in the way in which in the Netherlands Catholicism or Judaism are routinely denigrated. People got the message. Public figures who had small children withdrew from the media and the public debate. Self-censorship became rife. Publishers even refrained from reprinting Dutch books or offering them for translation into foreign languages – fearing that such things might draw unwelcome attention.

Martyrdom operations, suicide

Nidāl M’ālīk Hasan in 2009 and Van Gogh’s assassin in 2004, Jansen writes, survived their personal contribution to Jihād, but in most cases Jihād as a personal, individual, non-collective duty is difficult to distinguish from suicide, which is strictly forbidden in Islam. Nevertheless, in 1946 Franz Rosenthal (d. 2003) published an essay in which he mentioned suicide terrorism, “On Suicide in Islam,” *JAOS*, vl. 66, pp. 243-256. Already in 1946 he noted that in contrast with the negative Islamic attitudes towards suicide for reasons of depression, acts of Jihād martyrdom were extolled by some:

While the Qur’ānic attitude toward suicide remains uncertain, the great authorities of the hadīth leave no doubt as to the official attitude of Islam. In their opinion suicide is an unlawful act.... On the other hand, death as the result of ‘suicidal’ missions and of the desire [for] martyrdom occurs not infrequently, since death [in such situations] is considered highly commendable according to Muslim religious concepts. However, such cases are no suicides in the proper sense of the term.

Jansen states that a little over half a century later the “moderate” [the apostrophes are Jansen’s] Islamic scholar Dr. Yūsuf al-Qarādāwī (b. 1926) makes a distinction between jihād and suicide. Someone who kills himself, al-Qarādāwī stated in 2003, is “too weak to cope with the situation” in which he finds himself. “In contrast, the one who carries out a martyrdom

operation does not think of himself. He sells himself to Allah in order to buy Paradise in exchange.” Jansen took the quotes from American researcher Dr. Andrew Bostom’s study *The Legacy of Jihad*, Amherst 2005, p. 250.

Jansen comments, “But we have to ask ourselves another, more important question: if this is how the moderate Muslims reason, what can we expect from the radicals?”

It is important to mention here to Western readers that al-Qarādāwī is called “moderate” by many adherents to political Islam but is not considered “moderate” in the eyes of secular Europeans or many liberal Muslims. Jansen knows this. His usage of the word “moderate” is, therefore, intended to be sarcastic. Calling al-Qarādāwī a “moderate” or not depends on one’s own position. Al-Qarādāwī is widely seen as closely associated to the Muslim Brotherhood. I believe it to be fair to call him a tradition’Alīst. He certainly is influential. Look at his above mentioned position on surah 8:60. That was not a call for war but for being obedient to God because only God can protect Muslims from a Western invasion as seen in 2003 in Iraq.

Jansen:

There are no Islamic religious impediments that make suicide terrorism problematic from the religious point of view – on the contrary. To argue that religion, or at least Islam, applauds and approves of suicide missions is seriously defensible. Someone who goes on a suicide mission may well feel that he simply is doing his religious duty. He can, at least, be assured that his coreligionists and his religious leaders admire him for his determination. Others he certainly frightens.

Constituting elements of the ideology

For Jansen the conclusion of his study is clear: “The theology and ideology of Islam can both be used to justify violence and terrorism.”

Question to Muslim scholars:

21) Could you comment on this? How do Muslim scholars respond to Muslims who use arguments based on Islamic scriptures (Qur’ān, hadīth, sharī’ah, Islamic scholars, etc.) to justify violence and terrorism? It is good for Western readers to know how and which Muslim scholars oppose such explanations.

Hugh Goddard explained in his study [“Muslim Perceptions of Christianity,”](#) (1996), that the interpretations of Qur’ān, hadīth, and scholarly writings throughout the centuries have resulted in Eirenic (peaceful), moderate, and polemical responses that in turn can result in violence. That is a feature one sees in the history of all religions. It is certainly true that today there is more religiously motivated violence and terrorism in Islam than in other religions, but this is still no justification to simply dismiss the Eirenic and moderate responses Goddard discusses in his study.

Hans Jansen’s focus is political Islam which he calls an ideology, two Austrian scholars have pointed out. He writes:

That political Islam is characterized by a number of what these researchers have called *Ideologeme*, eight ‘elements of an ideology’, that can be summed up as anti-secularism, anti-Semitism, anti-liberalism, anti-communism, misogyny and homophobia. To this list an intense loathing for music and alcohol have to be added. (Thomas Schmidinger & Dunja Larise, Hrsg., *Zwischen Gottesstaat und Demokratie: Handbuch des politischen Islam*, Wien 2008, p. 33). Some would call these eight elements ‘memes’. A ‘meme’ can be defined as ‘postulated, imitable unit or element of cultural ideas, symbols or practices, transmitted from one person to another’. These eight memes are all of Islamic religious origin, and can each be demonstrated to be current in either the Qur’ān, or the Hadīth, or the Sharī’ah, or in two or three of these – but usually in all three.

A movement that consists of these eight elements, that has these eight themes as its ideological centre, cannot come to power democratically, Jansen argues. He continues: in a free and open society, or in any society, such a movement needs stealth and terror to have its way. If the supporters of such a movement are serious about their desire to reshape society (and the world), they will actually start to employ surreptitiousness and terror. They, however, sincerely believe that God has ordered them to do so. They feel they are part of God’s plans for humanity. They are the *Hizb Allah*, or “The party of God”. Their enemy is by definition the *Hizb al-Shaytan*, “The party of Satan” (Qur’ān 59:19 and elsewhere).

Jansen introduces in his conclusion the theoretical notions of ideology which he did not discuss earlier in his text. In the following section his political sympathy for the PVV of Geert Wilders becomes visible in the sentence where he speaks about the “Western ruling elite” and calls Muslim immigration to Europe an “invasion”:

Muslims may well see deeds that Westerners would consider to be acts of ‘terrorism’ as the fulfilment of the religious duty of Jihād, and this with good scriptural and other reason. It is, at the same time, completely understandable that the Western political elite want to deny that Islam may serve as a justification for terrorism: if the Western ruling elite would have been familiar with these Islamic aspirations, it should have protected the populations entrusted to their care, and prevented the Muslims from invading their countries. It is, on the other hand, completely understandable that Muslims deny that Islam may be used to justify terrorism: Why warn the enemy you are attacking? This will just prolong the struggle. It is in everybody’s interest that the struggle is not drawn out unnecessarily.

Jansen is praising Western society for its progress and liberty and places this in contrast to “an ideology that idealizes death and suicide. If Muslims continue to hold on to the battle cry that was made famous in Europe by the Spanish fascists in the 1930s, *Viva la Muerta*, ‘Long live Death’, they may successfully terrorize the West, but they will not win over many hearts.” Statements such as these, speaking of Muslims in general, instead of particular Muslim extremist groups, show that Jansen, with all his knowledge of Islam, is strongly polarizing, providing proof to Muslims that their religion is under attack, pushing moderates into the anti-Western camp. What use do such polemics bring? It sadly only strengthens the radicals on both sides—radical anti-Western extremists in the Muslim world and radical anti-Muslim extremists in the West.

Conclusion

Jansen claims that “the present Western political elite” refuses to see the Islamic component of violence. He thereby quotes Ibn Warraq, the pseudonym of an apostate from Islam who is at the same time, Jansen writes, an acute observer of its strength and weakness. Jansen, however, neglects to mention that this apostate is not an apostate to another religion but has said farewell to all religions. Anyhow, Ibn Warraq wrote in the aftermath of the Fort Hood massacre:

We are confronted, after all, with Islamic terrorists; and we must take the **Islamic** component seriously. Westerners in general and Americans in particular no longer seem able to grasp the passionate **religious** convictions of Islamic terrorists. It is this passionate conviction, directed against the West and against non-Muslims in general, that drives them. They are truly, and literally, God-intoxicated fanatics. If we refuse to understand that, we cannot understand them (CFI Releases, Statement from Ibn Warraq in response to Fort Hood Tragedy, November 11, 2009, Center For Inquiry, News).

Western peace of mind may be better served when we neither understand Ibn Warraq's statement nor the intoxication religions can evoke, Jansen writes.

Jansen states: There is a battle going on. This, again, is both reason to worry, and a truism. Nevertheless, a large majority of Westerners is ready to deny the reality of this battle till death follows, as it well may. On the other hand, there is little doubt how this battle will end once the West takes off its gloves, if ever it does.

Jansen does not note that Ibn Warraq writes about religions in general. This is someone who links religious passionate conviction that is directed against the West and non-Muslims in general to extremism. It is thus not all religious passionate conviction, but a particular kind of religious passionate conviction. That is certainly worrisome but no reason, as Jansen does, to mix between Islam and political Islam and in doing so claiming that all Muslims who take their religion serious constitute a danger to the non-Muslim world.

Jansen speech in terms of a battle is dangerous. The Muslim extremists he strongly opposes are equally at fault. Even more dangerous is that both believe they can win that battle. Jansen is dangerously is pleading for "the West takes off its gloves," as he puts it.

Polemics drive people apart, setting groups of people against other groups of people—a dangerous course for the entire world if over 1.2 billion Muslims would be pitted against the Western world. In 2002, Dr. Hamdī Zaqqūq, then Egypt's Minister of Endowments, gave a lecture entitled, "Der Islam und Europa – ohne Dialog kein Zukunft" in Germany. The Minister compared today's world to a global ship sailing across the universe, which has to avoid shipwreck at all costs. Shipwrecking can be avoided if the crew cooperates to set the ship's direction but the crew is not united. One part seems not to care about what others do and thus there is a serious risk of shipwreck due to lack of cooperation.

The better course is to engage in dialogue, cooperate with Muslims who oppose religiously motivated violence, argue with Muslims, supporting religiously motivated violence or not, that a literal interpretation of the Qur'ān and hadīth create havoc. Do not blame Islam but certain interpretations of Islam.

Jansen's literature list:

<http://www.arabistjansen.nl/Arabist/publicatielijst.html>

I have selected below the texts published by Prof. Hans Jansen in English and French and one title in Dutch and added some comments.

Hans Jansen, “The [Historicity](#) of Muhammad, Aisha and who knows who else,” *IFPS*, Copenhagen, May 8, 2011

CH: This is based on a major work in Dutch that was later translated in German about the historicity of the Prophet Muhammad. Jansen argues that the oldest source is the Qur’ān that mentions only very little about the Prophet. Most stories are based on the hadīth, but these texts were written at least 100 to several hundred years later and are thus not reliable in understanding who the Prophet was. In other words there is little to no historical information about him.

Johannes J.G. Jansen, “Foreword,” in: Marc van Grondelle, *The Ismailis in the Colonial Era: Modernity, Empire and Islam*, New York (Columbia University Press) 2009, xvi + 140 pp., p. vii.

---(tr.), “The Neglected Duty,” in: Roxanne L. Euben & Muhammad Qasim Zaman, *Readings in Islamist Thought: Texts and Contexts from al-Banna to Bin Laden*, Princeton 2009, pp. 327-343. (Repr.)

Johannes J.G. Jansen, review of *The Legacy of Jihad*, by Andrew G. Bostom, in: *Middle East Quarterly*, 15, 1 (Winter 2008), pp. 88-89.

Johannes J.G. Jansen, “The History of Islam in the light of the rational choice theory,” in: J.N. Bremer, W.J. van Bekkum & A.L. Molendijk, eds., *Cultures of Conversion*, Peeters: Leuven & c., 2006, isbn 90-429-1753-9, pp. 139-149.

Johannes J.G. Jansen, review of: Richard W. Bulliet, “The Case for Islamo-Christian Civilization,” New York 2004, in: *The International History Review*, XXVII, 4, December 2005, pp. 931-32.

---review of: “Bat YE’OR, Eurabia: The Euro-Arab Axis,” Cranbury, N.J., 2005, in: *Middle East Quarterly*, Spring 2005, Volume XII, number 2, pp. 91-92.

---review of: “SFAR, Mondher, Le Coran, est-ilauthentique?” Les Editions Sfar, Paris, 2000. (21 cm, 188), in: *Bibliotheca Orientalis LXII*, nr. 1-2 (januari-april 2005), pp. 181-182.

----“Jihād Ideologies and their Muslim Victims,” UNCHR Geneva, 2005; see http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/dpage_e.aspx?b=5&se=7&t=7, document NGO/8 (p. 2).

CH: I haven't read his preface to Bat Ye'or's book Eurabia, but an Arabist, who is a good friend of mine, read this preface and found this shockingly one-sided.

2004

Johannes J.G. Jansen, “De radicaal-islamitische ideologie: Van Ibn Taymiyya tot Osama ben Laden,” *Oratie* 3 februari 2004, Universiteit van Utrecht 2004, ISBN 90-76912-45-9, 32 pp.

----review of: Rippin, Andrew (ed.), “The Qur’ān: Formative Interpretation,” Ashgate 1999, xxviii + 386 pp., in: Bibliotheca Orientalis LXI, 3-4, 2004, pp. 419-20.

CH: This is one title in Dutch about the radical-Islamic ideology from Ibn Taymiyya to Usama bin Laden. He is focused on Ibn Taymiyya and later day Muslims who based their theories and beliefs on Ibn Taymiyya.

2000

J.J.G. Jansen, “Usūliyya (in modern Islamic theologico-political parlance),” in: Th. Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth a.o., eds., The Encyclopaedia of Islam, New Edition, Leiden (Brill), VI. X, pp. 937-38.

----, “Wā’iz (in modern times),” in: P.J. Bearmana.o., eds., Encyclopaedia of Islam, New Edition, Leiden (Brill) 2000, vl. XI, pp. 56-57. [Ar. wā’iz: ‘preacher’].
1999

Johannes J.G. Jansen, “Who Needs Fundamentalism?”, in: Martin Kramer, ed., Middle Eastern Lectures 3, Tel Aviv (Dayan Center) 1999, pp. 49-56.

1997

J.J.G. Jansen, The Dual Nature of Islamic Fundamentalism, London (Hurst) & Ithaca N.Y (Cornell University Press) 1997, 216 pp.

1996

J.J.G. Jansen, “Al-Shawkānī,” in: C.E. Bosworth e.a. (eds.), Encyclopaedia of Islam, New Edition, VI. IX, Leiden (Brill), p. 378.

----"We ourselves sometimes cannot get them," *Internationale Spectator* (Clingendael), 50, 5, Mei 1996, pp. 225-26.

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J.J.G. Jansen, "Jamācat al-Takfīrwa-'l-Hijrah," in: John L. Esposito, ed., The Oxford Encyclopaedia of the Modern Islamic World, New York/Oxford 1995, iv, pp. 179-181.

----"Shaykh ‘Abd al-Hamīd KISHK," in: John L. Esposito, ed., The Oxford Encyclopaedia of the Modern Islamic World, New York/Oxford 1995, ii, pp. 437-38.

----"The Significance of Modern Muslim Radicalism," in: C. van Dijk & A.H. de Groot, eds., State and Islam, Leiden (CNWS) 1995, pp. 115-123.

1994

J.J.G. Jansen, "Islam and Muslim Civil Rights in the Netherlands," in: Bernard Lewis & Dominique Schnapper, eds., Muslims in Europe, London (Pinter) 1994, pp. 39-53.

1993

J.J.G. Jansen, "MUDJAHID," in: Encyclopaedia of Islam², 1993, vii, 291-92, Leiden: Brill.

----, "Muhammad b. Ahmad al-Iskandarani," in: Encyclopaedia of Islam², 1993, vii, pp. 395-96, Leiden: Brill.

----, "Early History and Background of the Jews of Islam," in: J.M. Cohen, ed., *Jews under Islam*, Amsterdam 1993, pp. 9-23.

----"Muhammad Abu Zayd," in: Encyclopaedia of Islam², 1993, vii, pp. 420-21, Leiden: Brill.

----"Muhammad Farid Wadjdi," in: Encyclopaedia of Islam², 1993, vii, p. 439.

----"Mu'min," in: Encyclopaedia of Islam², 1993, vii, pp. 554-55, Leiden: Brill.

1992

J.J.G. Jansen, "Hasan al-Banna's Earliest Pamphlet," in: Welt des Islams, n.s. xxxii, 2, 1992, pp. 254-58.

----"L'Islam et les droitsciviques aux Pays-Bas," in: Bernard Lewis & Dominique Schnapper, Musulmans en Europe, Poitiers (ActesSud) 1992, pp. 55-71. (Translated into English, see above).

1991

J.J.G. Jansen, "Echoes of the Iranian Revolution of 1979 in the Writings of Egyptian Muslims," in: David Menashri (ed.), The Iranian Revolution and the Muslim World, Boulder (Colorado), Westview Press 1991.

1990

J.J.G. Jansen, "The Value of the Concepts of 'Nativism' and 'Revit' Alīzation' for the Study of Modern Islam," in: Le Maroc et la Hollande, Actes de la Deuxieme Rencontre Universitaire, Publications de la Faculte des Lettres, Rabat 1990, pp. 93-100.

----, "The Preaching of Shaykh al-Sha'râwî": Its Political Significance", in: W.A.L. Stokhof & N.J.G. Kaptein, eds., Beberapa Kajian Indonesia Dan islam/ Indonesian and Islamic Studies, Seri INIS, vi, Jakarta 1990, pp. 179-93.

1988

J.J.G. Jansen, "Ibn Taymiyya and the Thirteenth Century: A Formative Period of Modern Muslim Radicalism," in: Quaderni di Studi Arabi, 5-6 (1988), pp. 391-96.

1987

Johannes J.G. Jansen, review of: Bernard LEWIS, "Semites and Anti-Semites: An Inquiry into Conflict and Prejudice," New York/London: Norton 1986, in: *The Jewish Quarterly Review*, vl. LXXVII, October 1986-January 1987, Nos. 2-3, pp. 231-233.

1986

J.J.G. Jansen, The Neglected Duty: the Creed of Sadāt's Assassins and Islamic Resurgence in the Middle East, London/New York (Macmillan) 1986, 246 pp.

CH: A major book that shows the direction Jansen went into in his academic life.

J.J.G. Jansen, "The early Islamic Movement of the Kharidjites and the Modern Moslem Extremists: Similarities and Differences", in: Orient 27 (Hamburg), 1/1986, pp. 127-35.

----"Tafsîr, İğmâc and Modern Moslem Extremism", in: Orient 27 (Hamburg), 4/1986, pp. 642-46.

----"A Little-Known Endorsement by Shaykh Al-Shacrâwî," in: M. Marin, ed., *Actas del XII Congreso de la U.E.A.I.* (Malaga 1984), Madrid 1986, pp. 376-87.

1985

J.J.G. Jansen, "The Creed of Sadât's Assassins," in: *Welt des Islams*, N.S. XXV (1985), Leiden (Brill), pp. 1-30.

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J.J.G. Jansen, "Shaikh al-Sha`râwî's Interpretation of the Qur'ân," in: R. Hillenbrand, ed., "Proceedings of the Tenth Congress of the Union Européenne des Arabisants et Islamisants," Edinburgh 1982, pp. 22-28. Herdruktbuitenmedeweten van de auteur in: [A.H. Johns, ed.], Australian National University, Canberra, International Congress for the Study of the Qur'ân, 8-13 May 1980, Series 1, n.d. [1983], pp. 129-142.

----"The Voice of Shaykh Kishk," in: I.A. El-Shaykh, C.A. van den Koppel and Rudolph Peters, eds., The Challenge of the Middle East: Middle Eastern Studies in the University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam 1982, pp. 57-67 & 189-91.

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J.J.G. Jansen, "Polemics on Mustafa Mahmud's Koran Exegesis," in: R. Peters, ed., "Proceedings of the Ninth Congress of the Union Européenne des Arabisants et Islamisants," Leiden (Brill) 1981, pp. 110-122.

----"Tawfiq al-Hakîm on the Rigidity of Moslem Law," in: Bibliotheca Orientalis, XXXVIII (1981), pp. 13-16.

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
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