The popular Arab uprisings were, at their base, national opposition movements responding to the
misbehavior of the [ruling] regimes. They were neither sectarian in their demands nor in the context of
their struggles. However, the interference of the Gulf countries, led by Qatar, has begun to derail the
uprisings, indoctrinating them in a way that mobilizes the Sunnis of the region.
From the explosion of Arab society with popular uprisings that
used “the square” as a platform to face tyrannical regimes, to the
current prevailing state across the Arab world of having lost the
path to the future, a dire need has emerged to re-evaluate these
“transitions,” and the performance of the “leaders” and different
political forces in effecting change and finding a way out of the
never-ending questions and confusion.
Did the uprisings veer from their goals because they did not have a
unified leadership with a clearly laid out platform? Were the
leaders and political forces calling for change and working toward
it surprised that “the collapse” came faster than expected? Did they
not know how to confront the vacuum at the top of the pyramid of
authority and lead the forces of political Islam — with a history
rich in coups — in taking the opportunity to leap upward while the
former was preoccupied with differences and with an inability to
create a platform from which they could rule with the support of
the public and a sincere longing for change?
After a period of built-up carelessness, do these forces feel burned
by bitter experience and are they aware of their weaknesses? Have they become more devoted to
reformulating their studied platforms, the role of “the outside world” in the process of change, and
encouraging “political Islam” to join the adventure? [This question] is particularly appropriate since the “outside world” knows precisely the size of popular support for the forces of political Islam and
the disparities in their platforms. In turn, it knows the inevitability of these forces looking to [the
outside world] to help it ascend to power with political backing (however blatant) and economic
support (however limited) with burdensome conditions, keeping the door open to forces from “the
Square” who have continued in opposition as a way of domesticating political Islam and keeping the
movement for change within boundaries that do not threaten “foreign” interests.
Also, is it possible to talk about the revolution in “the square” in Egypt without getting into the
developments seen with the uprising in Tunisia, where political Islam has become the principal
component of its authority? Is it possible to ignore what has come of the situation in post-Gadhafi
Libya and the risks of civil war that have threatened the country?
Is it permissible to separate the dramatic developments seen in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya from what is happening in the Levant — particularly Syria, whose regime is fighting several oppositions, some of
which represent fundamentalist and Salafist organizations coming from far away, assuming leadership
to face the dictatorial regime? This has caused many farsighted individuals to join in chanting the
unifying slogan that has been raised: “The people want to bring down the regime.” Are these groups
not "the people,” and does this not automatically prompt the reconsideration of this regime, which
carries the first and most dangerous responsibility for the damage sustained by Syria?
Syria’s loss of its strategic role is a national catastrophe just as much as it is extremely profitable to the
Israeli enemy, gained nearly without having to fight.
The Arab oil families fight in its name, bringing together the different scraps of Islamic fighters, a
marked number of whom are not Arab, to bring down the regime on sectarian pretexts, while ignoring
a glaring point: the Syrian regime’s participation in the October (Yom Kippur) war (1973).
Syria’s loss is directly linked to Iraq’s, which had the same role that had been pivotal in the
Arab-Israeli conflict and was a source of hope for a complete Arab awakening, since it possessed great
economic, military and intellectual capabilities.
The most dangerous development in the Arab Levant is the current attempt to deviate the political
conflict from its trajectory and push it toward sectarian strife. The confrontations transpiring right now
between the regime in Baghdad (just as in Damascus) and the masses furious with shortcomings as
well as [brutal] police practices have been depicted as “revolutions against the Shiite-Alawite
domination of political decisions in Sunni nations.”
Of course, this is an attempt to distort the popular uprisings. However, the interference of the Gulf,
always led by Qatar, which has commissioned itself to carry out the gilded “revolution” in the Arab
World, has begun to derail these uprisings from their origins, mobilizing the Sunnis of the region who
feel slighted and oppressed by Iranian hegemony.
Iran, without a doubt, has a presence in the Arab Levant, in Africa, in Latin America and in all
Muslim countries.
This presence, however, is political first and foremost, benefiting in the first and last place from the
political vacuum that has been left by the tyrannical regimes around the Arab world. Even if Iran were
to incite the feelings of Shiites and to make them useful politically, its political influence would
remain limited if the people from any of these countries concerned were living a natural life, cared for
by the state as a people and not as a grouping of sects and confessions, some carrying painful
memories of being excluded and prevented from participation in running the country. The response to
Iranian “permeation” has been one that asserts the unity of the people through justice of the state in
dealing with its different components. There is to be a state for all or not a state at all. The outside
world can mess with it and the instincts of the groups, trying to incite strife and progress their efforts
to protect themselves from everybody else.
The Lebanese have a rich history in this field. For nearly a century and a half, the “nations” have
stepped forward and France has chosen to be a reference for the Maronites, Russia for the Orthodox,
the UK for the Druze, while the Sunnis remained with the Sultan, leaving the the Shiites without
anyone having stepped up to protect them, including Iran. Going back to the base of the subject, one
must be sure of the political essence of the popular uprising, taking into consideration the experiences
of rule in the Levantine countries created by the will of foreign powers. Its borders were demarcated
according to [foreign] interests and the nature of its ruling regimes were chosen while preserving the
distinctions among the different parts of a single people in distributing positions of authority.
Discussions have resurfaced in the Levant about the  Sykes-Picot Agreement (1916) concluded between French and British colonialists to divide up the Arab Levant. Parts of Syria were cut off to
form the Emirate of East Jordan for the Hashemites after King Faisal I was “run out of” Damascus.
Other parts comprising Mount Lebanon became the “Republic of Lebanon” as it is today. The region
of Mosul was cut off and included in Iraq under the British Mandate as a result of the discovery of oil
there.
The focus on sects now, instead of talking about the nature of regimes and their relationship with
democracy and keenness for the unity of the nations in the Arab Levant, seems to be an introduction
to new forms of political divisions that meet the interests of foreign countries after being redrafted.
The difference now is the help of the Gulf states. It is not necessary to bring up arguments about the
role of Qatar in the Syrian tragedy, or its provocative campaigns to divide Iraq on a sectarian basis
(after consecrating its division based on race between Arabs, Kurds and Turkmen).
If Egypt is preoccupied with its concerns resulting from political Islam taking over the reins of
authority, willing to plunge into the game of sectarian conflict, this basic Arab reference [Egypt]
seems to be either nonexistent or unable to play its unifying role. It is supposed to assert the unity of
the Arab peoples in their goals and bring it back to the original terrain of its struggle: the
establishment of a powerful state and confronting the Israeli enemy that is not longer “foreign” but
ever present and active in the game of sectarian conflict. It is the greatest beneficiary of the SunniShiite division that many have worked to turn into an armed confrontation.
In ignoring the original facts, most prominent of which is the unity of the peoples of the region —
Arab in identity in all their diversity of religions and sects — we justify the escalation of sectarianism
and confessionalism as the most dangerous weapon in facing the uprising as it progresses along the
path of revolutionary change.
Egypt is not totally safe from strife. In addition to the reactivation of the Coptic issue, there are also
those stoking the flames of conflict between the Sunnis and Shiites, knowing that there are only a few
tens of thousands of Shiites — not having at any point any political demands — drowning in a sea of
millions of Sunnis.
If sectarian strife were not present in Libya, then there is strife between the different ethnic groups. In
this regard, there are renewed discussions about the rights of the Amazigh in addition to the rights of
the state in reclaiming its independence on a tribal basis.
Strife is the greatest danger threatening the Arab uprisings, especially since it is  capable of
accommodating “countries” and their projects under hegemony over the region once again through the
use of sectarianism this time. In short, beware of sectarian strife!