Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, thank you for holding this important hearing
and for inviting me to testify today. For the past three years, Egypt has undergone
enormous political upheaval with four different regimes ruling the country. Despite
significant differences between those regimes, human rights violations have continued
to be the norm and not the exception. The focus of my testimony today will be on the
plight of Egypt’s indigenous Christians; the Copts, and their continued persecution
under Egypt’s various regimes.
On the 28th of November two separate attacks on Copts took place in the southern
Egyptian governate of Menya. In the village of El Badraman, a mob angered by rumors
of a sexual relationship between a Christian man and a Muslim woman attacked
Christians and burned several of their houses. In Nazlet Ebeid, the mob action followed
an attempt by a Christian to build a house in a piece of land he owns in a neighboring
Muslim village. In the aftermath of both attacks, security forces arrested Christians and
Muslims from the villages indiscriminately and forced a reconciliation session to calm
local feelings.
Unfortunately the latest attacks are neither random, novel, nor the last that will take
place. While the scale of attacks and persecution of Egypt’s Christians has varied under
the various regimes that have ruled Egypt, it has been part of a continued and
increasing pattern.
Under President Hosni Mubarak, Copts suffered both from widespread discrimination at
the hands of the Egyptian government as well as being targets of violent attacks on their
persons, property and churches at the hands of Islamists. In the last years of Mubarak’s
regime, the increasing participation of ordinary citizens in mob attacks on Copts became
a worrying phenomenon as the level of anti Christian hatred swelled.
Official government discriminatory policies included tremendous restrictions on the
building and renovation of churches, exclusion of Christians from key government
positions, punishment of converts to Christianity, and a variety of favorable policies
towards Islam as the official state religion.
The Islamist insurgency that brought havoc to Egypt’s southern governates in the late
eighties and until 1998 was especially brutal on Copts. Islamists, who viewed Copts as
warring infidels targeted their businesses and their churches. In many southern towns
and villages, Copts were forced to pay special payments, termed Jizya, to Jihadi groups
in order to protect themselves from attacks. The violent attacks forced many Copts to
flee the southern governates where they were historically concentrated to the capital,
Cairo, and further to the West.
In the last years of the Mubarak regime, Islamists were increasingly replaced with
ordinary citizens as the main source of attacks on Copts. Mobs composed of ordinary
citizens often formed at the slightest rumor regarding a perceived Coptic affront to
Islam. The three main causes of the mob violence were; rumors of a sexual relationship
between a Christian man and a Muslim women, which is not permissible in Islam,
rumors of a Coptic attempt at building or renovating a church, and rumors of a
perceived insult to Islam or its prophet by a Copt. The details of each attack varied, the
end result would not. A mob immediately formed and started attacking Coptic homes
and shops, ransacking and burning them. In some cases the mob attack would leave a
number of Copts killed.
Attacks on Copts took place in situations of complete police absence. While often aware
early on that mob attacks were to occur, the police never intervened to prevent those
attacks. Arriving at the scene after the attacks, the security forces resorted to arresting
both Christians and Muslims, often randomly and in equal number to appear even
handed. No distinction being made between victim and victimizer. Arrested Copts were
used as a bargaining chip by the security forces to force Copts into a reconciliation
session involving local community and religious leaders. Those sessions forced Copts
to drop any legal charges against the attackers and often forced Copts to sign
agreements prohibiting them from building a church and forcing Copts perceived as
having offended Islam into leaving the village. No punishment was ever brought on the
perpetrators of those attacks creating a culture of impunity.
The increase in the level of attacks on Copts reached its conclusion in the last days of
the Mubarak regime with the bombing of the Two Saints Church in Alexandria on New
Year’s Eve.
The hopes unleashed by the Egyptian revolution of a new era of harmony between
Egypt’s religious groups and an end to discrimination against Copts came to naught.
Instead, previous patterns of religious discrimination were reinforced and the number of
attacks on Copts substantially increased. The complete collapse of the police and the
state’s repressive apparatus liberated Islamists from any constraints. While on the
national level, Islamists were sweeping elections and dominating the political sphere, on
the local level, Islamists, more emboldened by the rise of their brethren nationally, and
the collapse of the police were increasingly asserting their power on Egyptian streets
and villages and enforcing their views on society. The ruling military regime proved both
unwilling and incapable of offering any protection to Copts and putting an end to attacks
on them.Attacks on Copts and their churches swelled dramatically under the rule of the Supreme
Council of the Armed Forces and they were no longer limited to obscure villages and
shantytowns but spread to the streets of Cairo. Church buildings were attacked and
burned, mob violence against Copts was on the rise, and the new horror of forced
evacuations from villages was becoming more common. Copts in small villages were
increasingly forced to adhere to the Islamists’ standards and vision enforced on the
ground. Violence against Copts reached its height with the Maspero massacre in
October 2011 when army soldiers shot Coptic protestors and ran them over with
armored vehicles. Continuing with practices developed by the Mubarak regime,
reconciliation sessions were held after attacks and perpetrators were not punished. It
was only natural that a culture of impunity would soon become a culture of
encouragement.
A new development was blasphemy charges, mostly brought against Copts accusing
them of defaming and insulting Islam. Seven Copts were accused in such cases under
the rule of SCAF with four of them receiving prison sentences. Their crimes varied from
being blamed for a facebook page insulting religion to simply being tagged in an
offending picture on facebook. Sentences increased during that period from two years
to six. Immediately as news of the perceived affront to Islam spread, an angry mob
would attack the home of the accused Copt looting and burning. Families of the
accused were forced to flee the area either willingly out of fear of harm or forced by
reconciliation sessions. Trials of the accused were a mockery of justice, with courts
surrounded by an angry mob and the accused denied legal representation.
Mohamed Morsi’s election to the Egyptian presidency aggravated an already
deteriorating situation. While the Muslim Brotherhood and President Morsi paid lip
service to ideas of tolerance and inclusiveness and promised equality for all of Egypt’s
citizens, such promises were made in English for international consumption. The reality
was strikingly different. During his one year rule, attacks on Copts dramatically
increased on the local level as well as exclusion on the national level.
On the national level, the scarce Coptic representation that existed in the government
further declined. As attacks on the local level increased, the government was unwilling
to take any action to protect Copts and punish the perpetrators of the attacks. President
Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood pushed forward a constitution writing process that
alienated non Islamists. After the withdrawal of non Islamist members and church
representatives, the suggested text, passed the following month in a popular
referendum, enshrined the Islamic nature of the state and the second class states for
Copts severely limiting equality and religious freedom.
The constitutional articles were a setback for equality and religious freedom. They
included dropping language prohibiting forced evacuations within the country (Article
42), limiting the freedom to practice religion and build houses of worship to “heavenly
religions” (Article 43), a blasphemy article (Article 44), a limitation on all the freedoms
and rights of the constitution as being exercised insofar as they do not contradict the principles in the section on state and society (read Sharia) (Article 81), a body to control
religious endowments (Article 212), and a very narrow definition of “the principles of
sharia”, which according to Article 2 were the main source of legislation (Article 219).
The Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist parties and leaders insisted on using
sectarian rhetoric that inflamed local angers against Copts. Copts were used as
scapegoats for the problems Egypt was facing from train accidents to opposition
demonstrations. The Islamists’ incitement against Copts was especially vicious during
electoral competitions. Islamists publically warned Copts of blood being spilled and
severe repercussions if anything would happen to the Islamist project. Islamist media
outlets continuously fabricated stories about secret Christian militias that were behind
street violence. The level of incitement by Islamists contributed to the increase of the
number and scope of attacks on Copts.
On the local level, both the number and scope of attacks on Copts increased under
President Morsi. The mob had a completely free reign to exercise its will on Coptic
victims. In April 2013, in an unprecedented and alarming development the Coptic
Cathedral in Cairo, the very center of Christianity in the country, where the Pope resides
and where the remains of Saint Mark the Evangelist are buried came under attack. The
attack, which lasted for a couple of hours and which Egyptians watched live on their
television screens shocked Copts and was the clearest indication of the indifference the
Morsi government held for the plight of Copts.
The number of blasphemy cases increased during President Morsi’s one year rule with
more Copts receiving prison sentences, and seven Copts receiving the death sentence
for their alleged roles in the anti Islam movie. Blasphemy accusations were
accompanied with attacks on the accused homes, forced evacuations and financial
penalties levied by reconciliation sessions.
President Morsi’s forceful removal from office by Egypt’s military was hailed and
supported by a wide spectrum of politicians and public figures in the country. The Coptic
Pope’s participation in the coup announcement meeting was however signaled out by
Islamists as a grave crime. Incitement against Copts reached unprecedented levels on
websites and in speeches of the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist groups.
Immediately upon the announcement of the coup, several churches were attacked.
Church walls were filled with anti Christian slogans, and Christian homes were marked
in many villages in the south of Egypt. In all of those attacks, the police was completely
absent.One telling example was the brutal attacks on the Copts of Nagaa Hassan near Luxor
on the 4th and 5th of July 2013. As the angry mob moved house to house looting and
burning and searching for the Christians to kill, they finally found a group of Christians
hiding in a home. The police, which arrived at the scene before the killing was to begin,
negotiated with the mob on taking the women and children out and leaving the men to
be killed. Four men were butchered in that house the second the police left with the
women and children. Major Khalid Hassan, Luxor director of security informed Human Rights Watch later that he found nothing wrong with the police’s performance. “There
was no reason for the police to take any special measures, it’s not [the police’s] job to
stop killings, we just investigate afterward.”
On the 14th of August, and as news of the military’s massacre of Morsi supporters in
Cairo spread around the country, angry mobs incited by Islamists ransacked, burned
and attacked churches and Christian owned businesses. Throughout the day, the mob
was completely free to act as it pleased with the police nowhere in sight. The
destruction was immense. Among the destroyed churches was one built in the 4th
century. In many instances, the mob was able to return and continue its attack for a
number of days. The attacks that day were the single largest attack on churches in
Egypt since the 14th century.
Despite hopes held by many Egyptians and especially Copts that the Muslim
Brotherhood’s removal from power would result in an improvement of their condition,
Egypt’s new regime has shown little interest in dealing with the root causes of the
sectarian problem. The free rein given to the Egyptian security forces in their fight
against Islamists has meant a continuation of previous patterns of security practices
against Copts. The security forces have done little to prevent attacks on Copts from
occurring and less to find and punish the perpetrators. They have resorted to
indiscriminate arrests of Christians and Muslims in order to force reconciliation sessions
that ensure that the guilty party escapes punishment.
Egypt has witnessed tremendous political changes in the past three years with
revolutions and military coups taking place in a quick pace. After thirty years in power,
Hosni Mubarak was sent to a prison cell, and Mohamed Morsi moved from a prison cell
to the presidential palace and back again to a prison cell. Throughout those three years
however, the plight of Christians has not seen any positive change, but has instead
gravely deteriorated. No matter who rules Egypt, the twin phenomenon of the growing
hatred of Christians and the willingness of their neighbors to attacks them, and the
failure of Egyptian governments to protect them and stop the attacks have become the
hallmarks of the Copt’s continued plight.